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ABSTRACT 
 
Alica S. Sparling: Income, Drugs and Health: Evidence from Russian Elderly Women 
(Under the direction of Donna B. Gilleskie) 
 
This dissertation examines the effects of pension income and total household income on 
elderly Russian women's decision to obtain prescribed or recommended drugs and their subsequent 
health. The conceptual framework is a dynamic utility maximization problem that incorporates 
uncertain health and is based on concepts from the unitary model of household consumption and 
Grossman's model of the demand for health. The modeled outcomes include the probability of having 
drugs prescribed, the decision to obtain drugs and the health outcome, which are jointly estimated as a 
set of equations using the discrete factor approximation method that controls for individual, time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The sample is constructed from the Russia Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey rounds between 1994 and 2002. 
The study finds that income has a modest positive effect on health of Russian elderly women, 
but does not find evidence of income affecting their decision to obtain drugs. Contrary to the unitary 
model, the relative control over household resources matters because an increase in pension income 
has a much larger positive effect on the elderly woman's health than an increase in some other 
household member's income. This study also finds that obtaining all prescribed or recommended 
drugs lowers the probability of descending into bad health by 10 percentage points for women with 
good or average lagged self-assessed lagged health that were prescribed drugs, implying that drug 
therapy can be an effective form of disease management.
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
  
1.1 Specific Aims 
The objective of this study is to enhance our knowledge of the relationship between income, 
access to drugs and the health of elderly women. I address the effect of income on drug purchasing 
behavior and the effects of income and the decision to obtain drugs on health.   
The relationship between income and health has been studied extensively by economists, and 
multiple reinforcing paths between income and health have been proposed. One obvious avenue that 
explains the causal relationship between income and health is access to medical care, which is 
enabled by higher income and leads to improved health. In my study I focus on a particular type of 
medical care, prescription drugs, which have been a rapidly growing component of medical care 
expenditures in the developed world. The total demand for drugs is significantly influenced by the 
drug demands of the elderly. The elderly are more likely than younger people to have multiple 
ailments and to rely on drugs to maintain their health, trusting that taking drugs as directed allows 
them to manage and possibly avoid further health complications. The possible benefits of drugs, in 
the face of rising medical care expenditures, underscore the importance of studying factors 
influencing the drug purchasing behavior of the elderly and the effect of their drug consumption on 
health.  
This study investigates the relationship between income, access to drugs and health using a 
sample of Russian elderly women interviewed between 1994 and 2002. The sample includes only 
women because women and men exhibit differences in health trajectories and life expectancies, 
requiring separate analyses of their behavior and health outcomes. During the studied period Russia 
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was (and still is) an environment of great resource constraint, which makes it a suitable setting for 
studying the access motive in the income-health gradient. Russia officially entitled all citizens to free 
medical care but not to free drugs. Most individuals paid for drugs out-of-pocket, although some 
qualified to receive government subsidies. Between 1994 and 1999, drug expenditures constituted 
over half of out-of-pocket medical care expenditures of an average Russian household 
(Besstremyannaya, 2002). Drug expenditures were found to be highly regressive, constituting 21 
percent of the monthly income of the poorest households while only 5 percent for the wealthiest 
households (Feeley, 1999). Based on the survey used in this study, Russians increasingly complained 
about not being able to afford drugs: Zohoori, et al. (2001) note that the percent of elderly considering 
lack of money a reason for not obtaining medications rose from 24 percent in 1994 to 71 percent in 
2000.  
One of the study’s aims is to isolate any differences between individual income effects and 
household income effects. I distinguish between these two types of income because the majority of 
elderly Russians live in households with at least one other adult. Thus their wellbeing and 
consumption is likely to be affected not only by their individual income but also by the total 
household income. Pension income is the most important component of the elderly person’s 
individual income in Russia. More than 80 percent of the elderly’s income comes from the 
government pension so I use this measure to investigate the effect of the elderly woman’s individual 
income. A standard model of household resource allocation, the unitary model, suggests that 
households pool resources and that consumption of individual members depends on household’s total 
income but not on individual members’ contributions to it (Becker, 1981). I use a two-period 
variation of this model as a theoretical framework for my assessment of the importance of pension 
income versus total household income in elderly women’s decisions to obtain drugs and maintain 
health. In order to test the household pooling hypothesis, I restrict my sample only to elderly women 
who live with other adults. 
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 The elderly who face the decision of whether or not to obtain drugs first had drugs prescribed 
or recommended to them by someone in a medical institution. The probability of receiving a drug 
prescription or recommendation depends both on the doctor’s assessment of the patient and the 
elderly woman’s initiative to seek out medical help in the first place. The same characteristics of the 
elderly, such as unobserved health, attitudes to doctors or risk aversion, influence the probability of 
drug prescription and drug purchasing decisions. I therefore model the probability of drug 
prescription and address sample selection issues by jointly estimating drug prescription, drug 
purchase and health outcomes.   
 An important aim of this study is to measure the dynamic effect of income and the decision to 
obtain drugs on the elderly woman’s ability to improve her health outcome over time. According to 
Grossman’s model of health production, people’s motivation for demanding medical services or drugs 
is derived from their demand for good health (Grossman, 1972). Using a two-period model I evaluate 
whether higher income and health investments influence future health outcome.  
The study uses seven rounds of the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) 
collected between 1994 and 2002. The RLMS offers comprehensive information on income, health 
and medical care, both at the household and individual levels. Seven rounds of observations and the 
breadth of information obtained give us a unique opportunity to study the income-health gradient and 
the decision to obtain drugs in order to gain insights for maintaining the health of the elderly. The 
panel character of the dataset also allows us to explore the appropriateness of panel data estimation 
techniques.  
 
1.2.  Contribution to Literature and Policy Relevance 
This study makes several contributions. It tests the household resource pooling theory in a 
new setting of drug utilization in Russia. It makes an addition to the growing body of literature on 
access to health care and drug utilization in Russia. Dynamic modeling of the relationship between 
income, drug purchase decisions and health using a panel data set makes a contribution to the 
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literature evaluating the benefits of income and health investments on health of the elderly. The 
study’s findings can help policy makers assess whether targeted government transfers via pension 
income are efficient tools for improving the elderly people’s access to medical care and drugs and 
health. 
In spring 2005 Russian newspapers cautiously and foreign newspapers less cautiously 
covered upset reactions to a major change in Russian law pertaining to benefits enjoyed by many 
elderly.  The new law that went into effect in January 2005 eliminated various Soviet-era established 
in-kind subsidies, which included free or discounted drugs for people with a doctor-board-approved 
status of an invalid. In place of these subsidies all elderly would receive a cash transfer. Many 
ordinary elderly Russians worried that the new law would lower their living standard. Demonstrations 
objecting to the new law occurred, and so far only a few regions have had the courage (and resources) 
to fully implement the new law. This study covers an earlier time period (1994-2002), but its design 
allow me to simulate what would have happened to the drug purchasing behavior and health of the 
elderly Russian women if such policy had been implemented during the studied period.  
Another policy application of this study relates to understanding how household members in 
Russia share resources. Such understanding is essential for choosing appropriate policies for 
improving the elderly women’s welfare. If households pool resources, then government policies 
aimed at transfers would not alter the household’s resource allocation and can be neutral with respect 
to the household recipient of the transfer. It would not matter for improving the elderly person’s 
welfare whether the source of the improvement was a higher pension, a lower labor income tax for 
working household members or a higher government child support payment. Conversely, if the 
relative control over resources in the household influences the allocation of these resources among 
household members, then increasing the elderly person’s pension income would have a stronger 
positive effect on the elderly person’s welfare than interventions targeting other household members 
or the household as a whole. 
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 Last but not least, although this study looks at the effect of elderly people’s drug consumption 
on health in Russia, its findings may also have policy relevance to the U.S. The Medicare Prescription 
Drug Bill has brought attention to the issues of effectiveness of drug use in improving general health. 
The financial burden of this program on taxpayers is extensive, making it important to understand the 
effect of drugs on health maintenance, and thus future utilization and costs of other Medicare covered 
services.  
 
1.3.  Overview of Chapters 
 The study is organized in the following chapters: Chapter 2 reviews literature on the 
relationship between income, drug utilization and health and on empirical tests of household resource 
pooling hypothesis, and it summarizes facts about Russia’s health care and pension systems. Chapter 
3 presents the conceptual framework, and Chapter 4 introduces the empirical framework. The sample 
used in the dissertation is described in Chapter 5. Results, which include both marginal direct and 
total effects and simulations of effects of selected policies, are presented in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 
concludes and discusses limitations and potential future research.
  
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE AND BACKGROUND 
 
 
2.1. Relationship between Income, Drug Utilization and Health 
The economic literature offers differing views on the merits of income and economic 
resources as determinants of increased medical care, drug utilization and health. Akin et al. (2001) 
point out that the effect of income on the demand for health services cannot be predicted in advance 
because an increase in income can lead to an improved health status not only through the increased 
capacity to purchase medical care, but also through purchases of other health-improving goods, which 
might actually lead to a drop of medical visits.  Deaton and Paxson (1998) name several potential 
causal paths from income to health: poorer people have less access to health care, live and work in 
less healthy environments and are more prone to exhibit behaviors such as smoking or obesity. In 
addition to the effect of absolute income on health, more recent literature has also explored alternative 
reasons for the causal path from the socioeconomic status (SES) to health: income inequality, relative 
social rank, and elevated cumulated stress1 (allostatic load), which is hypothesized to be higher for 
low SES (Smith 1999, Wilkinson 1996, Deaton and Paxson, 1998, 2001). A growing body of 
literature is also investigating the opposite causal link - leading from health to SES (Thomas and 
Strauss, 1997, Currie and Madrian, 1999, Dwyer and Mitchell 1999, Liu et al. 2003).  
The angle, focus and methods of studies of the effect of income on health are very diverse. 
Ettner (1994) finds a positive effect of household income on self-assessed health and functional 
limitations. The author uses an instrumental variables method to control for the endogeneity of 
                                                 
1
 Per Dr. Carey, MD, of C.Sheps Center in Chapel Hill, NC, stress leads to higher cortisol and 
noradrenergic hormones, which lead to greater cardiac risk. 
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household income in a cross-sectional study. Smith and Kington (2001) use ordered probits and a 
range of definitions of income and wealth to assess the effect of income on self-assessed health. They 
find that the income effects are nonlinear and most important in the poorest households and that 
different sources of income have different effects, and note that there is a compelling evidence of a 
strong causation link from health to income.  In a more recent study, Adams et al. (2003) test the 
hypothesis of no direct causal link from socioeconomic status, which consists of wealth, income and 
residence variables, to mortality and health innovations of the elderly population. They find no direct 
causal link from SES to mortality and the incidence of sudden, acute conditions and some association 
of SES with incidence of gradual onset conditions, such as degenerative and chronic diseases. It is not 
clear, however, whether this association is due to a causal link or some common unobserved (genetic 
and behavioral) factors that affect both SES and health. Manning et al (1987) found small income 
effects on demand for out-patient medical care using the experimental data from the RAND Health 
Insurance Study. Smith (1999) ponders that especially at older ages, current economic resources may 
not have a quantitatively large impact on the current stock of health, because current health stock is a 
reflection of an entire history of incomes, health behaviors, prices and initial health endowments 
accumulated over years.  
Newhouse (1993) using the RAND Health Insurance Study found that although lower 
insurance increased health services utilization, it had only minor effects on health outcomes. There 
has been some skepticism regarding small magnitudes of the effect of medical care on health 
outcomes in the US and other developed countries, sometimes coined as practice of “flat-of-the-
curve” medicine.2 However, many new medical treatments and drugs are dedicated to improving 
quality of life and relief of suffering rather than increasing longevity, which are hard to measure 
outcomes, which in turn may result in finding dissipated effects of treatments. Further, the problem 
                                                 
2
 “Flat-of-the-curve” medicine refers to the flat region of the health production curve. The total product 
curve exhibits the property of diminishing marginal returns to medical care. Eventually, at high quantities of 
medical care consumed, each additional unit of medical care leads only to a very small improvement in health 
outcome. 
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may apply to some treatments and drugs but not all (e.g. treatment of cardiovascular conditions). 
Russia, where less than 5 percent of GDP was devoted to health care during the studied period, is 
probably further away from the possibility of “flat-of-the-curve” medicine.  
In Russia, Jensen and Richter (2003) look at the effect of income shocks on mortality and the 
use of medical services. They use a differences-in-differences model and find that pensioners with 
pension arrears in 1996 (i.e. who did not receive pension payments for at least a month during the 
pension crisis) declined their use of medical services and were more likely to die in the following two 
years.  Stillman (2002) uses an instrumental variable method to estimate the effect of transitory 
income variation in Russia on energy intake, nutrition quality and BMI and finds an effect only on the 
diet composition. Both papers use the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. 
Stillman and Thomas (2006) distinguish between the effect of permanent (longer-run) 
income, which they also associate with economic growth, and transitory household resources (income 
fluctuations) on nutritional status and assess whether low income households are able to smooth out 
income fluctuations. They focus on the same period as this study and associate the large income 
volatility with the effect of globalization. Household resources are proxied by household per capita 
non-durable expenditures.  
The issue of access to medications by elderly people has received an increasing interest in the 
U.S. and has been addressed by a growing body of literature mainly in Canada and the United 
Kingdom (O’Brien, 1989, Grootendorst, 1995). These studies focus on effects of cost sharing and 
prices rather than income effects. In Russia, limited research has been published on drug utilization. 
Street et al. (1999) analyzed drug use of households in three Russian regions in 1996. The authors 
estimated the effect of discounts on the integer count of prescriptions purchased by the household 
using Poisson, Negative binomial, and Zero-altered negbin models, and the effect of discounts on 
drug expenditures using a two-part model. They found that full exemption from drug charges 
increases the number of prescriptions received by a household and reduces the probability of 
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incurring expenditure. The authors found no evidence of a significant income effect on the receipt of 
prescriptions and drug expenditures.  
 
2.2. Household Income Pooling 
Consumption decisions, such as whether or not to buy drugs, of elderly living in extended 
households quite likely depend not only on their individual income but also on consumption and 
incomes of other household members. In such case it is more appropriate to analyze the elderly’s 
consumption using the household rather than individual utility maximization framework. Several 
competing economic theories describe the household behavior. The most basic distinction is between 
the unitary model and game-theoretical models. The unitary model describes the household acting as 
a single unit. The competing models, such as collective and Nash bargaining models, assume that 
individual household members may have different preferences and arrive to the household resource 
allocation decisions via some bargaining process. The rejection of a unitary model implies that one of 
the alternative models should apply. However, due to extensive data requirements for testing the 
alternative models it has been difficult to assess which one of them, if any, more accurately describes 
household resource allocation than the unitary model.  
The unitary model is easily tested and is a good starting point for comparisons with any other 
models, assuming that sufficient data exist to test the other models. Although the unitary model has 
been criticized as an “empirical straight-jacket” for household consumption (Vermeulen, 2000), it is a 
sufficient tool for assessing whether the source of income matters and provides useful information to 
policy makers whose aim is to improve wellbeing of the elderly, for example through their access to 
medical care or health. If only the total household income matters then any government policy that 
increases the household welfare will have the same effect on the elderly person’s welfare as a targeted 
pension income increase. If not, then a government policy directly targeting the elderly would be 
more efficient in increasing the welfare of the elderly.  
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The unitary model allows us to analyze household utility maximization by using the same 
approach as for an individual utility maximization. The model has three testable implications: the 
Slutsky matrix is symmetric (i.e., marginal compensated wage changes have the same effect on each 
other’s labor supply – Vermeulen, 2000), the Slutsky matrix is negative semidefinite, and the 
nonlabor income source has no effect on resource allocation (i.e. households pool resources). A test 
of the third, income pooling condition is conducted in this study.  
The pooling hypothesis has been examined in several studies (e.g., Schultz, 1990, Thomas 
1990) both for labor supply and consumption decisions.  Lundberg et al. (1997) reject the pooling 
hypothesis in tests based on cross-sectional variation of income received by different household 
members (elderly parents and adult children, husbands and wives) but note that the tests may not be 
completely reliable because their income measures may not be exogenous to wages, prices and other 
determinants of consumption behavior. Altonji et al (1992) point out that one cannot fully control for 
the total household income if wage rates vary across members because changes in wages result both 
in income and substitution effects, and therefore effects of husband’s earning’s from wife’s earnings 
in the unitary model can differ. Household income effect can be made independent of wages only by 
restricting preferences: the utility function must be either homogeneous or additively separable 
(Blundell 1986 and Browning et al. 1985).  
Pezzin and Schone (1997) test the pooling restriction using a sample of 583 elderly residing 
with their adult children drawn from the Survey of Assets and Health Dynamics. The authors use 
Probit, Ordered Probit, Poisson and OLS methods to estimate the effect of the child’s non-labor 
income on her labor supply, provision of informal care, parent’s prescription drugs utilization and 
parent’s doctor visits while controlling for total household non-labor income, parent’s health and the 
child’s demographic and sibling characteristics. The authors conclude that their sample does not 
behave consistently with the common preference, unitary models. Total non-labor household income 
had a negative effect on the number of prescription drugs demanded by the elderly parent, but the 
share controlled by a child had a significant positive effect. The authors also found a significant effect 
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of the share of non-labor income controlled by the child on her labor supply and provision of informal 
care, which contradicts the prediction of the unitary model that the coefficient on the child’s income 
is zero when controlling for household income. The authors found no income effects on parent’s 
number of doctor visits, which they explained by Medicare subsidies available to all elderly. 
Duflo (2002) found that an exogenous individual income shock had a positive effect on 
health of children in South Africa. She tested the unitary model by assessing whether the gender of 
the pension recipient in South Africa affects nutritional status of the grandchild and found that 
pensions received by women had a larger positive impact on the weight for height of girls, rejecting 
the pooling hypothesis. The author emphasized that a test of the unitary model requires a permanent 
exogenous change in income that happens after household formation.  
Lundberg et al. (1997) took the advantage of a policy change in the UK that transferred a 
substantial child allowance from father (tax reduction on father’s paycheck) to mother (direct cash 
payment) and compared family expenditures on men’s, women’s and children’s clothing before and 
after the policy took effect. In the linear regression equations (both for before and after the policy 
change) the dependent variables are ratios of children’s to men’s clothing and women’s to men’s 
clothing. Independent variables of interest are three dummies representing the period after the policy 
change for different household sizes. Control variables are income (expenditures) and household 
composition measures. The authors found that a shift toward increased expenditures on children’s and 
women’s clothing relative to men’s clothing occurred following the policy change transferring 
resources from husband to wife, and rejected the pooling hypothesis.  
Tests of the unitary household model are particularly relevant to policymakers in Russia 
where almost 80 percent of the elderly women lived in households with other adults during the 
studied period.3 In the context of Russia and in contrast to most studies, Jensen and Richter found no 
differential effects by gender of the elderly of their pension arrear vs. pension arrear of other 
household member on their health (2003). 
                                                 
3
 Source: RLMS dataset used in this study. 
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2.3. Background on Russia  
 
Economy and Health Care in the 1990s 
The study looks at a period marked by profound economic changes in the Russian Federation. 
Transition to market economy brought hyperinflation in 1991 that wiped out many people’s savings, 
freeing of wages and most prices in 1992, privatization of state-owned companies, pension crisis with 
the problem of pension arrears in 1996, and a financial crisis in the fall of 1998, during which the real 
GDP fell by 10 to 15 percent over a very short time period.  
Russia spent spends 4.3 percent of GDP on health care in 1995, a number that steadily 
declined to 2.9 percent in 2000 (UNECE 2003).4 During the studied period, the Russian health care 
system underwent decentralization and financial restructuring. Free medical care continued to be 
guaranteed by Russia’s constitution, but it was impossible to be delivered due to the lack of funding 
collected from the traditional general taxation and the new compulsory health insurance system.5 The 
cost of new treatments and drugs increased in the 1990s, but its funding from the public sources fell 
by one third (Shishkin 2000). Inadequate funds had a striking effect on hospitals struggling to 
continue to provide free hospitalization. Many hospitals began to request that patients buy and bring 
their own drugs and supplies like bandages. Some polyclinics (physician offices providing out-patient 
services) initiated co-pays for services such as x-rays. Reports of unofficial under-the-table payments 
both in hospitals and polyclinics were abundant, ranging from simple boxes of chocolates to 
expensive surgery payments.  
                                                 
4
 In 2000, the percent of GDP spent on health care was around 8 percent in most EU countries and 
above 13 percent in the US. (http://www.unece.org/stats/trends/ch6/6.15.xls ) 
 
5
 Traditionally, health care was funded by general taxation. In 1993 a compulsory social/state medical 
insurance was adopted, funded by statutory employers’ contributions (World Health Organization, “Highlights 
on health in the Russian federation,” 1999).  In 1997, insurance covered over one third of all expenditures, and 
in 1998, 87 percent of the total population was insured. However, the source of funding of health care – general 
taxation versus compulsory insurance - was irrelevant to the decision making of the elderly at the time of this 
study.  
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The pharmaceutical sector has also changed radically since the early 1990s. Domestic 
production of drugs collapsed and drug imports have proliferated. Consumer drug selection and drug 
prices increased. Private pharmacies began to compete for clients against state pharmacies. There was 
an abundance of pharmacies in urban areas, and to attract clientele pharmacies often offered 5 to 12 
percent marketing discounts to seniors.6  
Although Russia did not provide drug benefits specifically geared to the elderly or the low 
income group, elderly individuals could receive either a 100 or 50 percent drug price discounts if they 
belonged to one of the government-designated categories of patients (e.g. disabled, war veterans, 
Chernobyl survivors) or diseases (e.g., cancer, diabetes, bronchial asthma, recovery period up to six 
months after myocardial infarction). These categories were grandfathered from the Soviet times when 
people also paid for drugs out-of-pocket unless they qualified for exemptions from charges. Elderly 
individuals eligible for discounts most often belonged either to the war veteran category or the 
disabled category. The assignment of the disability (“invalid”) status was constrained by federal 
guidelines. Three types of disability groups defined by the Law of State Pensions of RU were 
Category 1, consisting of people permanently disabled and incapable of work who require constant 
attendance; Category 2, consisting of people incapable of work but who do not require constant 
attendance; and Category 3, consisting of people partially disabled and 50 percent incapable of work 
(Becker and Merkuryeva 2003). Each applicant’s eligibility, as well as prescribed discounted drugs, 
were determined by the local certified board of physicians, who based their decisions on each 
patient’s comorbidities.   
The Ministerial Order from 1994 updated categories of citizens and diseases that qualified for 
discounts on the approved formulary of essential drugs. Street (1999) noted that this government 
decree from 1994 gave regions (called oblasts) autonomy in determining exempted drugs, eligibility 
requirements and reimbursement levels. I found that the exemption rules for invalids, war veterans 
                                                 
6
  Pharmacists whom I interviewed in commercial and social pharmacies in Saratov, Novgorod and St. 
Petersburg, considered prices across competing pharmacies comparable. 
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and victims of Chernobyl were honored across regions, most likely because their drugs received 
federal funding.7 I found regional differences in granting discounts based on specific disease 
categories. Per manager of one of the Novgorod pharmacies, drugs in these disease-specific 
categories were funded from municipal budgets.   
In each district, only several assigned pharmacies, called “social” pharmacies, had the right to 
dispense discounted drugs to eligible patients.8  Discounted drugs were dispensed only on prescription 
and were carefully tracked.  Patients were required to obtain a new prescription for drug refills from 
their polyclinic on a monthly basis. I found from anecdotal evidence that some eligible individuals 
were discouraged from taking advantage of discounted drugs because of the time costs associated 
with getting the refill prescription and traveling to a social pharmacy, which could be located far from 
the polyclinic, and because many drugs were not on the government’s formulary and thus did not 
qualify for a discount. So, instead individuals eligible for discounts chose to buy drugs in a 
commercial pharmacy.  
In January 20006 a new law replacing the system of providing discounted drugs to selected 
groups with cash payments to all elderly came into effect.  The law lead to many protests and resulted 
in pension hikes to compensate recipients of discounted drugs, such as invalids and veterans, many of 
whom are elderly. 
 
Pension system 
The most important source of the elderly person’s individual income is pension, constituting 
more than 80 percent of the person’s individual income. After the financial crisis of 1998, real 
                                                 
7
 In summer of 2003 I took a one-month field research trip to Russia to learn about the Russian health 
care system, funded by the Sheps Center International travel scholarship. During this trip I visited hospitals, 
policlinics, pharmacies and research institutes, and interviewed doctors, pharmacists, administrators and 
researchers in four cities (Moscow, Saratov, St.Petersburg and Velikij Novgorod).  
 
8
  These social pharmacies were selected by local governments through tenders and dispensed 
discounted drugs supplied by the government at separate counters from commercial drugs. The lure to compete 
for the social pharmacy status was the government’s payment of 3 percent of the value of the dispensed drugs, a 
guarantee of a 90 percent discount on property rent, and a regular stream of customers qualifying for discounts. 
Approximately two to three social pharmacies were in place per district with 100,000 inhabitants. 
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pension fell to only 30 percent of its real value in 1990 (Gurvich 2002). Mroz et al. (2001) report that 
although in mid 1990’s pension-aged individuals were less likely to live in households with income 
below the regional poverty lines than individuals in other age groups, poverty rates of the elderly 
increased more than those of any other group: from 6.7 percent in 1992 to 30.6 percent in 1996. The 
poverty rates of the elderly then fell to 25 percent in 1998 and 15 percent in 2000. The authors 
contemplate that this development could be a reflection of an increase in pension income between 
1998 and 2000.  
Russia has a mandatory, almost universal pay-as-you-go public pension system (Sinyavskaya, 
2004). The rules for the old age and service pensions originate in the 1956 Soviet pension law 
(Lushkina, 2001). Women with 20 years of service and at least 55 years old, and men with 25 years of 
service and at least 60 years old qualify to receive pension. In this study, the sample of “elderly 
women” includes all women at least 55 years old who reported receiving pension income. This 
definition thus represents a younger group than is typically considered as elderly in U.S. studies. 
Some people, such as workers in unfavorable conditions, may qualify for earlier retirement. 
The 1990 pension law states that pension can be between 55 and 75 percent of the wage base, which 
is the average individual salary for the last two or any continuous five years of service (Sinayavskaya  
(2004), Luxembourg Income Study). On top of the initial 55 percent replacement rate of the wage 
base the elderly gets an additional 1 percent increase in pension for each additional year of service up 
to 75 percent of salary. The pension amount is loosely indexed against inflation and the minimum 
pension is not supposed to fall below the minimum wage. The elderly receiving pension were allowed 
to work without any restrictions in hours worked or salary. Jensen and Richter (2003) note that as of 
1996 the pension eligibility was not affected by current employment status.  
Jensen and Richter (2003) summarized how the pension system functioned in 1996. The age-
qualified individuals (26 percent of Russia’s population in 1996) received pension in form of monthly 
cash transfers from the Pension Fund of Russia. The Pension Fund’s decentralized system consisted 
of one federal, 80 regional and 2342 local departments in 1996 and was financed from a payroll tax. 
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Regional offices collected the revenue, made payments to its pensioners and forwarded any surplus to 
the central fund, which then redistributed the funds to ‘debtor’ regions. In 1996, there were 15 ‘donor’ 
regions and 74 ‘debtor’ regions. 1996 was a year of decreased economic output in Russia, which 
translated into the government’s problems with collection of funds for pensions. The result was that 
many pensioners faced pension payment lags. Pension arrears reported by the respondents of the 
Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey were 33 percent in 1996 and fell to 15 percent in 1998. 
Officially, the pension arrear problem was solved in 1999, per statement of M. Zurabov, chief of 
Russia’s Pension Fund.  
About 4.2 percent of all pension-age women and 10 percent of all pension-age men in the 
RLMS claimed to receive a disability pension in 2001.9 To receive the benefit the disabled person 
must have worked a minimum of 1 to 15 years before the onset of disability. Disability categories 1 
and 2 received 75 percent of wage base and Category 3 received 30 percent of the wage base (Becker 
and Merkuryeva 2003). If information on individual wage base was unavailable then disabled in 
Categories 1 and 2 received pension equal to the minimum old-age pension and disabled in Gategory 
3 2/3 of the minimum old-age pension. The same minimum and maximum pension amounts applied 
both for the disability pension and the old age pension. Category 1 received an additional supplement 
for constant attendance (Luxembourg Income Study).   
People eligible for disability pensions also qualified for drug discounts, free transportation 
and discounted utilities. Becker and Merkuryeva state that these benefits double pensioners’ real 
income (their source is FBEA 1998) and give an incentive for the elderly (and others as well) to apply 
the disability status. Sinayavskaya  (2004) notes that upon reaching the pension age people could 
choose to change the status of disability pension to old age pension if the latter was higher.  
According to Becker and Merkuryeva (2003) average Russian disability pension is 10 percent lower 
than old-age pension, which leads to the switch of disability pension to old-age pension upon 
reaching the pension age, while continuing to use other disability perks.
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 These figures were lower before 2000 when the question about pension type was phrased differently. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
The theoretical model depicts the relationship between income, health investments and 
the health outcome of an elderly woman. The conceptual framework is a two-period household 
utility maximization problem that incorporates the uncertain health of its members. The elderly 
woman’s decisions are considered to be part of the household’s optimization problem. The 
theoretical model is based on concepts from Grossman’s (1972) model of the demand for health 
and Becker’s (1981) unitary model of household consumption. In Sections 3.1 and 3.2 I briefly 
describe parts of these two models that directly relate to this study’s model of behavior. The 
theoretical model is described in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.  I present testable hypotheses derived 
from the model in Section 3.5. 
 
3.1. Motivation: Grossman’ Model of Demand for Health  
Grossman (1972) introduced the economic concept of the commodity “health,” where health 
is viewed both as a consumption good and an investment good. Health increases the individual’s 
utility in two ways: by making him feel better (consumption aspect), and by increasing the number of 
days available for work and other productive activities in the subsequent periods, thus affecting the 
individual’s future income and consumption of all other commodities (investment aspect).   
An individual receives utility from the composite consumption commodity Zt  and healthy 
days ht. The individual maximizes lifetime utility U(h0,h1,h2, …, hT, Z0, Z1, Z2, …ZT) subject to the 
lifetime budget constraint, ime constraint, and production functions for h and Z. Both healthy days h 
and the commodity Z are assumed to increase utility at a decreasing rate (Uh>0, Uhh<0, Uz>0 and 
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Uzz<0). Healthy days ht are considered a flow of services produced from an accumulated health stock 
Ht where ht = f(Ht), ( f’>0 f’’<0). Each time period, the health stock Ht depreciates at rate δt, but this 
depreciation can be alleviated by making an investment It in health. The health stock in the following 
period is then determined in the health production function Ht+1 =  Ht   – δt Ht  + It . 
The gross investment in health, It = g(mt, THt; Et) is a function of health-producing medical 
care mt , time spent in the mt activity, and the human capital Et. The demand for medical care is a 
derived demand because individuals do not receive utility from health investments directly; instead 
the benefit of health investments is realized as an improved health stock in the future, allowing for 
more productive time in the future. 
At an older age, health depreciates faster than at a younger age. To produce the optimal 
health stock, elderly people increase their gross investment in health, which includes the use of 
medical services. At some point, however, the cost of maintaining one’s health stock increases too 
rapidly and it becomes optimal to let health fall and eventually reach a level corresponding to death at 
time T. 
 
3.2. Motivation: Becker’s Unitary Model 
The traditional approach that reconciles the individual’s behavior with a household behavior 
is the unitary model, also referred to as the neoclassical or common preference model.  According to 
this model, a household pools income from all its members and the distribution of consumption 
depends only on the total household income. The source of income is irrelevant to the household’s 
allocation decisions.  Thus, an elderly woman’s drug consumption and health would be influenced 
only by the total income of her household, but not by the share of her contribution to it.  
 Samuelson (1956) and Becker (1981) developed two different motivations for the household 
behavior in the unitary model. Becker assumes that an altruistic household head (a dictator) makes 
transfers to supplement income of members in need. Samuelson assumes that all household members 
have the same preferences and arrive at the optimal resource allocation by consensus. Thomas (1990) 
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states that the assumption of the same preferences of all household members and the assumption of 
the dictator are observationally equivalent for the purposes of testing the household income pooling 
hypothesis. I use Becker’s approach as a blueprint for my theoretical framework.  
In Becker’s (1981) unitary model the household head is an effective altruist, and his utility 
depends positively on the utility of other household members. If the household consists only of the 
altruistic household head A and one other household member (e.g. elderly woman E) then the 
household head’s utility function is [ ])(, EAA UZUU ψ=   where  0>
∂
∂
E
A
U
U
,  and ψ  >0 is a 
function of the other household member’s utility EU . 10  
The altruists’ behavior is altered by his altruism: he does not consume at his endowment point 
but transfers a positive part of his income to other household member.  He consumes TYZ AA −= , 
which is equal to his income AY less the contribution T made to the other household member E. Price 
of Z  is set to one. The altruist’s contribution allows the household member’s consumption to be 
TYZ EE += .  
The altruist maximizes his utility AU  subject to the household budget constraint 
SYYZZ EAEA =+=+  where S is the total household income. The equilibrium condition for the 
altruist’s allocation of resources is  1=
∂∂
∂∂
EA
AA
ZU
ZU
.  In equilibrium, the altruist receives the same 
marginal utility from his own consumption as from the consumption of the other member E. The 
equilibrium condition gives us the household head’s demand functions )(SZZ AA =  and 
)(SZZ EE = .  
If the other household member E is selfish she maximizes )( EE ZUU =  subject to her 
budget constraint TYZS EE +==* where S* is her allocated share of the household income and 
                                                 
10
  Implications of the model continue to hold when more than two household members (Becker 1981).  
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EY is her individual income (e.g. pension income). It is in her interest to maximize the household 
income S because then her utility is maximized too; thus she appears to act altruistically towards the 
altruistic head (known as the Rotten Kid Theorem).  The household member E would refrain from 
any actions that would raise her income by less than the resulting fall in T received from the altruistic 
head.  
However, if the selfish E increases her income to the point where the contribution T is 
eliminated then the altruist no longer maximizes the household income. Maximization of the 
household income is more likely to occur if E is also altruistic and makes contributions to the 
altruistic A  if her income is sufficiently large relative to altruist A. Maximization of the household 
income would also always occur if household members have the same utility function.  
 
3.3. Theoretical Model – Household Head’s Optimization Problem 
The theoretical model is motivated both by Grossman’s model of demand for health, in which 
demand for medical care is demand derived from our demand for health, and Becker’s unitary model, 
in which a household pools resources.   
In this model, the household (i.e. the effective altruistic household head A) maximizes a two-
period household utility function subject to (1) the total household income budget constraint ( 1S and 
2S ), (2) health production functions ith ,  (3) the commodity itZ  production functions, and (4) the 
time constraints ti ,Ω   Subscripts i=1..N refer to household members, one of whom is E = the elderly 
woman of interest in this study, and t=1, 2 refer to the two time periods.  
Household members receive utility from a composite consumption commodity ( 2,1, , ii ZZ ) 
and health ( 2,1, , ii hh ) in each period 1 and 2, where Uh > 0 Uhh < 0, Uz > 0 and Uzz < 0. Total 
household income in Periods 1 and 2 ),( 21 SS  is the sum of all members' labor income (wages w) and 
non-labor income (y, e.g. pension income) in the respective periods. In period 1, 1S  equals the sum of 
  21 
household members’ expenditures on X used to produce the composite commodity Z and expenditures 
on medical services m used to produce health. In Period 2, household income 2S equals the 
expenditures on X because in this two-period model we assume that household members invest in 
health only in the first period (so 02, =im ).  
The two-period household utility function 
)],(),...,,(),,(,,[ 11313131111 NNNEEEAAA hZUhZUhZUhZU     Period 1 
)]],(),..,,(),,(,,[[ 22323232222 NNNEEEAAA hZUhZUhZUhZUEδ+     Period 2 
is maximized subject to  
(1) the total household income budget constraint, 
∑∑∑
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(2) the health production functions,     
ih1  is exogenous        Period 1 
);,( 2222 iHiiii hTmfh =          Period 2 
where 0/ 12 >∂∂ ii mh , 0/
2
1,2,
2 <∂∂ ii mh ; 0/ >∂∂
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t Th   
(3) the commodity Z production functions, 
);,( itZititiit hTXfZ =  where  0/ >∂∂ itZit hT  , 0/ >∂∂ Zitit TZ ,  and t=1, 2 Period 1, 2 
(4) and the time constraints. 
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In Period 1, health ( 1,ih ) is given, exogenous. Each household member makes a health 
investment in medical care, 1,im  and spends time on health producing activities 
H
iT 1, . In Period 2, 
health 2,ih  is endogenous; it is a function of the investment in health 1,im  and 
H
iT 1, made in Period 1 
and depends also on the exogenous 1,ih .  
Each time period, each household member has a fixed total amount of time (Ω) available, 
which is divided between work, health producing activities, commodity Z producing activities and 
time lost due to illness. δ  is a time discount factor. By assumption, the utility function is additive and 
separable. Commodities ( 2,1, , ii ZZ ) and health ( 2,1, , ii hh ) are normal goods.11 
 
3.4. Theoretical Model – Elderly Woman’s Optimization Problem 
Assuming that the altruistic household head (A) allocates household resources among house 
members by making transfers and that the elderly woman is a selfish household member, we can 
write down the elderly woman’s optimization problem. The elderly woman maximizes a two-period 
utility function subject to the budget constraint allocated to her by the altruist (S*) and subject o her 
health production function and the commodity Z production function.  
I assume that the she is out of the labor force ( WT1 =0) and receives pension income from the 
government (non-labor income y). I further assume that only two states of health are possible: good 
health ( Gh ) or bad health ( Bh ). The focus of this study is the elderly woman’s decision to obtain 
drugs; thus I assume that 1m  represents drug consumption and it is the only health investment in the 
elderly woman’s optimization problem (which means that HT1 =0 and T= ZT1 ).  
In each time period, the elderly woman receives utility from health h and the composite 
commodity Z. Following the unitary model, *1S  and 
*
2S are fixed money amounts allocated to her by 
                                                 
11
  There is no saving or borrowing in this model. If added, we would need only one budget constraint, 
with Period 2 components discounted by interest rate. 
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the altruistic household head (A) from the total household income ),( 21 SS . In Period 2, the elderly 
woman’s health 2h  is stochastic. The probability p of health 2h  in Period 2 depends on the previous 
period’s health 1h and the health investment 1m .  
max       





=+ ∑
= BGh
hZUhmhhphZU
,'
2211
'
211 ),(),|(),( δ  
   
    Period 1         Period 2 
subject to  11*1 mXS +=       Period 1  
  2
*
2 XS =       Period 2 
  );( 112 hmfh =     Period 2 
);( ttt hXfZ = , t=1, 2   Period 1 
The elderly woman’s choice variables are m and X.  In this study, the variable of interest is 
drug consumption 1m  in Period 1. It affects the elderly woman’s utility in two ways. On one hand, 
drug consumption reduces the amount of income available for consumption of good 1X  in Period 1, 
which lowers utility in Period 1. On the other hand, drug consumption increases the probability of 
health 2h  being good ( Gh ) and thus increases utility in Period 2.  
The first order condition ( 0
1
=
∂
∂
m
U ) derived from the elderly woman’s utility maximization 
problem states that when the elderly woman optimally allocates resources between m and X, the 
negative marginal utility of 1m  in Period 1 equals the expected marginal utility of 1m  in Period 2. 
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The effect of the drug consumption 1m  on the probability of good health 
),|( 112 hmhhp G=  in Period 2 is considered positive because health investments, such as drug 
consumptions, are input in the health production function, and I assume that individuals make health 
investments only if they increase the probability of being in good health in the future.  
We can sign the effect of an increase in income *1S on drug consumption 1m  and the 
probability of good health p( 2h = Gh ). If we assume that m and h are normal goods then an increase in 
income ( *1S  ) will lead to an increase in 1m and better health in Period 2.  
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Assuming that an increase in total household income )( 1S  leads to an increase in the income 
allocated to the elderly in the unitary household model ( *1S ), then the marginal effect of increasing 
total household income )( 1S  on drug consumption is positive too: 0
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3.5. Hypotheses 
The theoretical model leads to the following empirically testable hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1:   
 
An increase in the Period 1 household income has no effect on the elderly person’s 
spending on health investment (such as drug utilization). 
:0H   0
1
1 =
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m
   versus :AH   0
1
1 ≠
∂
∂
S
m
 
Hypothesis 2: Health investment (such as drug utilization), holding prices and wages constant, is a 
function of the total household income. The elderly person’s resource control 
(pension 1y ), controlling for total household income, has no additional effect.   
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Hypothesis 3: An increase in the Period 1 household income has no effect on the probability of the 
elderly person’s health being good in Period 2. 
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Hypothesis 4: The probability of being in good health, holding prices and wages constant, is a 
function of the total household income. The elderly person’s resource control 
(pension 1y ), controlling for total household income, has no additional effect. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
To test the hypothesized effects of income on the decision to obtain drugs and health derived 
from the theoretical model, the empirical model jointly estimates one selection equation (drug 
prescription), one demand equation (drug purchase) and one production function (health outcome). 
The dependent variables are functions of pension income, household income, lagged health, a set of 
individual and community characteristics and time and regional controls. The preferred estimation 
method is the discrete factor approximation method that controls for individual, time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity.  
In Section 4.1 I describe the individual’s decision making process in the context of the available 
data in order to bridge the theoretical model with the empirical model. In Section 4.2 I discuss the 
unobserved heterogeneity in my sample and present specifications of the individual equations in the 
preferred model. In Sections 4.3 and 4.4 I describe the discrete factor approximation method and the 
model’s identification restrictions. In Section 4.5 I introduce alternative estimation methods used for 
comparisons of results with the preferred method. 
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4.1. Behavioral Decision Making Process 
The empirical model follows the theoretical model while taking into account the particulars of the 
available data for Russian elderly women. Figure 4.1 shows how the timing of measurement of the 
key variables in the RLMS survey corresponds to the theoretical model’s Periods 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 4.1: Key Variables in the Theoretical Model and RLMS 
 
 
 
 
State Observed Entering Period 1: 
 Measured at the End of 1994: 
    Health ( 1H ):  
 
 30 days prior to the survey,1995: 
    Pension Income ( 1Y ) 
    Household Income ( 1S ) 
Choices Made in Period 1: 
 30 days prior to the survey,1995: 
    Drug prescription ( 1P ):  
    Drug purchase ( 1D )  
 
State Observed Entering Period 2: 
 Measured at the End of 1995: 
    Health ( 1H ):  
 
 30 days prior to the survey,1996: 
    Pension Income ( 1Y ) 
    Household Income ( 1S ) 
 
In this example, year 1995 corresponds to Period 1 in the theoretical model and 1996 to Period 2. 
The elderly woman enters Period 1 with the health stock ( 1H ) inherited from the previous period, 
measured in this study as self-assessed health. She observes her pension income ( 1Y ) and the 
household income ( 1S ) at the beginning of Period 1. In Period 1, the elderly woman may be 
prescribed drugs or recommended to obtain drugs by a health professional in a medical institution 
( 1P ). Conditional on having drugs prescribed or recommended, she then decides whether to make a 
health investment and obtain these drugs ( 1D ). The elderly woman enters Period 2 with an updated 
health stock ( 2H ).   
 
            Period 1 =  1995                                              Period 2 = 1996 
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4.2. Equation Specification 
  
4.2.1. Modeling Unobserved Heterogeneity 
There are several reasons why when investigating the relationship between income, drug 
purchase and the health outcome we should assume that the unobserved components of the selection 
(drug prescription), demand (drug purchase) and production (health outcome) equations are not 
independent.  Ignoring unobserved heterogeneity of the sample would lead to biased estimates. The 
preferred model used in this study mitigates bias from the following sources:  endogeneity of health 
in the drug prescription, drug purchase and health outcome estimation, endogeneity of drug 
prescription, drug purchase in the health outcome estimation, and selection bias in the drug purchase 
estimation.  
In the theoretical model (Section 3.4) and its behavioral counterpart (Section 4.1), health 
stock is a function of lagged health and health investment (the decision to obtain drugs) made in the 
previous period. The decision to purchase drugs is a function of lagged health and permanent, 
individual unobserved characteristics influencing both health and the drug purchase decisions. Thus 
the decision to purchase drugs should be treated as an endogenous explanatory variable in the health 
production function.  
When we extend the conceptual framework beyond two periods, it follows that the lagged 
health itself must be a function of health and health investments made in earlier periods, making it an 
endogenous explanatory variable in the health production function too. While the use of a lagged 
health measure in the estimation of drug purchase would eliminate the problem of reverse causality, 
lagged health continues to be endogenous in the drug purchase equation due to the presence of 
individual unobserved characteristics affecting both health and health investment decisions.  
Last but not least, the RLMS survey collects data on the drug purchasing behavior only for 
those individuals who report having drugs prescribed to them, which may lead to the selection 
problem. Such problem arises if there is a systematic difference between individuals in the subset 
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with a drugs prescription and the subset without it because the selection into the two subsets was not 
random with respect to the outcome (Jones 2000, Heckman 1979). In such case any estimates 
obtained from only one subset would not be representative of the full sample. It is quite possible that 
people with drug prescription have certain unobserved characteristics that the other group lacks. For 
example, their unobserved health may be worse or, conditional on the same health, they may trust 
their doctors and health care system more or place a higher value on their health than those people 
who were not prescribed drugs. Because of these reasons, they may be more likely both to seek out 
medical care leading to more opportunities to have drugs prescribed as well as obtain all prescribed 
drugs.12  
The presence of unobserved heterogeneity means that the drug prescription, drug purchase 
and health outcome equations have correlated error terms and should be estimated jointly. In the 
jointly estimated model used in this study, the individual’s permanent unobserved heterogeneity (µ ) 
enters all equations as a random effect explanatory variable. It serves as a proxy for the individual’s 
characteristics that do not vary over time, such as certain aspects of unobserved health, genetic 
disposition to disease, health preferences, risk aversion and attitudes towards the health care system. 
For example, an elderly person highly risk averse about health is more likely to seek out medical care 
to treat a health problem, obtain prescribed drugs and make lifestyle decisions that help maintain her 
health.13  
                                                 
12
 Lundberg et al. (1997) note that labor income should not be included in testing the pooling 
restriction because hours worked by household members are simultaneously determined with the household 
consumption choices. However, in this study, I assume that income and the living arrangement are exogenous 
and determined outside of the model. This assumption should be relaxed and examined by future research. The 
same unobserved characteristics may have affected both health and past labor supply and earnings of the 
individual - and therefore today’s pension, as well as the elderly’s decision to live in an extended household 
with an adult child, and other household members’ labor supply decisions, which in turn affect household 
income.  
 
13
 An earlier version of the model included also time-variant unobserved individual heterogeneity tν , 
which would capture, for example, unobserved natural aging and the health deterioration rate.  The estimation 
results though indicated that including this type of unobserved heterogeneity did not improve log likelihood.  
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The error term etε  for each equation e where e=H, D, P, consists of two parts 
e
t
ee
t u+= µρε .  In each equation, the coefficient 
eρ
 is the factor loading on the permanent 
unobserved effect µ  and is estimated as one of the parameters in the set of equations.  The 
coefficient eρ represents the correlation of each equation with the unobserved heterogeneity term, 
and its value varies from equation to equation. The component u of the error term is an independent 
mean zero error term that is distributed logistically as the dependent variables are dichotomous 
outcomes as explained in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.4. The discrete factor analysis used to estimate this 
model with unobserved heterogeneity is described in Section 4.4 of this chapter.  
 
4.2.2. Drug Prescription and Drug Purchase Equations 
An individual enters each period having inherited their health stock tH  from the end of the 
previous period. She also observes household income HHtY  and pension income 
E
tY .  Then she 
makes a decision whether to invest in health by obtaining prescribed or recommended drugs ( tD ), 
conditional on having been prescribed a drug ( tP ).14  Thus, the unconditional probability of drug 
purchase ( tD ) depends on the probability of the drug prescription ( tP ): 
),1|1Pr(*),|1Pr()|11Pr( µµµ =====∪= ttttt PDPPD .  
The probability of drug prescription tP  is estimated using a logit model:  
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14
 The RLMS asked all surveyed individuals whether they were prescribed or recommended drugs by a 
health professional in a medical institution in the past 30 days, but only those who answered yes were then 
asked whether they obtained all, some or none of these drugs.   
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Explanatory variables in the drug prescription equations include tH , which is a lagged health 
state measured at the end of  the previous survey round, individual’s socio-demographic 
characteristics ( tX  : age, education, living arrangement dummies that combine information on 
presence of a spouse and an adult child in the household, number of household members in 
retirement age, working age and less than 18 years old), community characteristics ( PtC : community 
average rates for drug discount eligibility and size, drug availability, and medical care utilization: 
prevention, treatment of health problems and hospitalization rates), interacted regional and time 
controls ( tO ) and unobserved permanent individual heterogeneity (µ ).15 
The decision to obtain all drugs ( tD ) is defined as a choice between obtaining [All] versus 
[Some or None] of the prescribed or recommended drugs. It is estimated using a logit model: 
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All explanatory variables are the same in the drug prescription and drug purchase equations 
except for the community average rate of drug prescription. The average drug prescription rate is 
excluded from the drug purchase equation (and the health outcome equation). It serves as a proxy for 
the environment influencing the doctor’s prescribing behavior but not the patient’s drug compliance 
decision.16  
In all equations, the elderly woman’s pension income ( EtY ) enters the equation separately 
from household income ( HHtY ). Household income already encompasses her pension income as well 
                                                 
15
 An earlier version of the empirical model included time-variant individual unobserved 
heterogeneity tν  but I simplified the model because I found that accounting for tν  did not improve the 
goodness of fit of my estimations. 
 
16
 All exclusion restrictions are tested for validity. 
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as all remaining sources of household income. If the unitary model is correct, only the coefficient on 
household income should be significant. Thus, a statistically significant pension coefficient would 
imply a rejection of the income pooling hypothesis.17  
 
4.2.3. Health Outcome Equation 
The dependent variable in the health production function is health outcome. In the theoretical 
model it corresponds to health stock at the beginning of Period 2. It is measured as self-assessed 
health measure with two states (bad versus average/good), constructed from five possible answers 
(very bad, bad, average, good and very good) in the survey  
Health production is estimated using a logit model:  
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Health stock in period (t+1) is a function of variables in period t: income, lagged health, drug 
prescription, drug purchase choice, drug prescription and purchase interacted with lagged health, 
demographic variables and regional and time controls. Health stock is also affected by the unobserved 
individual heterogeneity and thus estimated jointly with the drug prescription and drug purchase 
equations. 
The community average rates of drug discount eligibility and size and for drug availability 
are excluded from the health outcome equation. They are assumed to affect health only through their 
effect on the drug prescription probability and drug purchase decisions. 
 
                                                 
17
 I test hypotheses derived from the theoretical model by looking at total income effects, which 
include not only the direct effect described here but also indirect income effects channeled through other 
sources (lagged health, drug prescription).   
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4.3.4. Initial Condition Health Outcome Equation 
I account for the endogeneity of the initial health stock 0H by estimating it as a reduced form 
equation. 0H  is observed by the econometrician in the first year of data collection for each individual 
and used as an explanatory variable in the second time period.  
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Health stock in the initial condition equation is affected by the same unobserved permanent 
individual heterogeneity affecting the remaining equations.  Identification of this initial condition 
equation is achieved by using two variables, the elderly person’s height and height interacted with 
age, as exclusion restrictions.   
 
4.3. Estimation Strategy: Discrete Factor Approximation Method 
The empirical strategy must account for the presence of unobserved individual characteristics 
that affect the health outcome, the drug prescription probability and the drug purchase decision. The 
method used to solve the set of equations in this study is the discrete factor random effects 
approximation method (Heckman and Singer 1984, Mroz and Guilkey 1992, Mroz 1999). 18 It is a 
semi-parametric approach that provides consistent estimates. Mroz and Guilkey (1992) extended the 
method to the system of simultaneous equations and showed that it performs as well as two-stage 
methods and parametric maximum likelihood estimators imposing joint normality if the errors are 
normal, and performs better if distributional assumptions are incorrect.  
The discrete factor approximation method does not impose distributional assumptions on the 
error terms, but assumes that the unobserved heterogeneity can be approximated by a discrete 
distribution with a finite number of mass points of support and associated probability weights. In 
                                                 
18
 The model is estimated using a FORTRAN program Leo with permission of Dr. Mroz. 
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order to get an unconditional likelihood function, the likelihood function conditional on unobserved 
heterogeneity must be integrated with respect to the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity.  
The distribution of heterogeneity is integrated out through a weighted sum of probabilities.  
Let’s assume that the unobserved permanent heterogeneity µ  follows a discrete distribution 
with K points of support, defined as )()( kpr k πµµ ==  for k=1, 2, …, K. The location of the mass 
points and the associated probability weights are estimated jointly with other parameters of the 
model (the first mass point of support is fixed at 0 and the last one is fixed at 1 so only the location of 
the in-between points are estimated from the data). The number of mass points of support K is 
determined empirically by the researcher by comparing the likelihood, the coefficients on the 
endogenous variables and the goodness of fit of models with different heterogeneity specifications. 
All parameters, including mass points and probability weights are estimated within the 
maximum likelihood framework. In this model, the full unconditional  maximum likelihood function 
for N individuals is calculated by multiplying each nth individual’s  vector of probability weights 
)(kπ  on K points of support of the distribution of permanent unobserved heterogeneity µ  (line 1) 
with the individual’s contribution to the likelihood function at the initial time period (line 2) and the 
individual’s contribution to the likelihood function at the remaining time periods t =2 through T 
(lines 3, 4, 5). 
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The n’th individual’s contribution to the likelihood function in one of the remaining time 
periods t, conditional on the permanent individual unobserved heterogeneity (µ ), is a product of the 
probabilities of drug prescription (P t ), drug purchase choice (D t ) conditional on drug prescription 
(P t ) and health (H 1+t ).  nT  is the last observed period.  
 
4.4. Identification 
Identification of the system is achieved through present and lagged exogenous variables, 
present and lagged i.i.d. error terms (i.e., restrictions on the covariance matrix), exclusion restrictions 
in the initial condition equation, exclusion restrictions in the drug prescription and drug purchase 
equations, and the nonlinear functional form of all equations (logits). 
Endogenous drug purchase tD , drug prescription tP  and health stock tH  are estimated as 
functions of both endogenous and exogenous right-hand side variables: 
),,,,,,,( DttDtttHHtEtt uOCXHYYDD µ=  
),,,,,,,( PttPtttHHtEtt uOCXHtYYPP µ=  
),,,,,,,,(1 HttHtttttHHtEtt uOCDPXHYYHH µ=+  
All endogenous variables on the right-hand side can be expressed in terms of lagged 
exogenous and endogenous variables, for which in turn we can substitute lagged exogenous variables 
and i.i.d. errors. The path of lagged exogenous variables and i.i.d. errors that generates the variation 
necessary for the model identification begins in period t=1 where the initial condition equations for 
health stock is identified through two variables excluded from the remaining equations (height and 
height*age).  
Exclusion restrictions in individual equations should be highly correlated with the 
corresponding outcome variables, but have no direct effect on outcome variables in equations from 
which they are excluded. Height and height interacted with age are proxies for early childhood 
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health. They are used as instruments in the initial condition equation and are excluded from all time-t 
equations. The average drug prescription rate proxies the doctor’s propensity to prescribe drugs and 
is used as an instrument in the drug prescription equation; it is excluded from the drug purchase and 
health equations. Community average rates for drug discount eligibility and size and availability of 
drugs in pharmacies are included in the drug prescription and drug purchase equations, but are 
excluded from the health outcome equations. 
 
 
4.5. Alternative Estimation Strategies 
 
I estimate the drug prescription, drug purchase and health outcome equations using 
alternative methods in order to better understand how modeling unobserved heterogeneity in the 
preferred, jointly estimated model changes the coefficients. Models described in Sections 4.5.2 and 
4.5.3 address endogeneity of drug prescription and drug purchase in the health outcome equation. 
The model in Section 4.5.3 also addresses the selection bias associated with modeling drug purchase. 
The alternative models, as opposed to the preferred, jointly estimated model, do not control for the 
endogeneity of health. Instead, they treat lagged health as an exogenous regressor, which may lead to 
biased estimates if lagged health is correlated with unobserved characteristics.   
 
4.5.1. Exogenous Model – No Correction of the Unobserved Heterogeneity Bias 
 This model does not attempt to correct for any source of unobserved heterogeneity. Each 
equation is estimated separately. Errors are assumed to be uncorrelated across equations. Drug 
prescription and drug purchase enter the health outcome equation as exogenous explanatory variables.  
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4.5.2. Instrumental Variables Method with the First-Stage Modeled as a Two-Part Model – 
Partial Correction of the Unobserved Heterogeneity Bias 
In this model I treat drug prescription and drug purchase as endogenous explanatory variables 
in the health outcome equation and use the instrumental variables approach to correct for this 
endogeneity. I generate predicted values of drug prescription and drug purchase using the drug 
prescription and drug purchase equations. The predicted values then enter the health outcome 
equation as explanatory variables instead of the observed values. I use the linear probability model in 
the 2nd stage. 19   
The first stage, in which I estimate drug prescription and drug purchase, is treated as a two-
part model. A two-part model assumes that error terms in the two equations are independent.  This 
assumption could be considered feasible in my study because the decisions to prescribe/recommend 
drugs and obtain drugs are made sequentially by different entities, a doctor and a patient.  Some of 
the same unobserved variables influence both the drug prescription and the drug purchase decisions, 
such as unobserved health dimensions and patient’s attitude to health and health care institutions 
(patient had to seek out medical care to be prescribed drugs), but the correlation of errors in the two 
equations may be small. If this correlation is small then a two-part model could be an appropriate 
method. 
 
 4.5.3. Instrumental Variables Method with the First-Stage Modeled as a Sample Selection 
Model – Partial Correction of the Unobserved Heterogeneity Bias 
As in Section 4.5.2., I use the instrumental variables approach to estimate the health outcome, 
with predicted values of drug prescription and drug purchase entering the health outcome equation as 
                                                 
19
 I report the conditional standard errors as reported by Stata and do not bootstrap the standard errors. 
In their discussion of the two-step probit regression, Bollen, Guilkey and Morz. (1995) note that when a 
predicted value of the endogenous regressor is included in the estimation of the 2nd equation, the Monte Carlo 
evidence does not suggest that computed adjusted standard errors are more effective than the conditional 
standard errors in large finite samples.   
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regressors instead of their observed values. But the first stage, in which I generate the predictions of 
drug prescription and drug purchase, is now treated as a sample selection model instead of a two-part 
model.  
The sample selection model assumes that the errors between the drug purchase and drug 
prescription equations are correlated. This assumption implies that many of the same unobserved 
characteristics affect both the likelihood of the drug prescription and the patient’s decision to 
purchase drugs. People with worse unobserved health, a higher unobserved propensity to trust the 
doctor’s judgment and those who value their health more on the margin are more likely to seek out 
medical care and thus be prescribed drugs as well as adhere to the doctors’ advice to buy drugs than 
those with opposite characteristics. Further, due to the specifics of the drug prescription rules in 
Russia, people with unobserved worse health are probably overrepresented in the drug purchase 
equation because those people who qualify to receive discounts and tend to be sicker must go back to 
doctors’ office every 30 days to get a prescription refill while those people who do not qualify for 
discounts - and tend to be healthier - can keep buying their drugs over the counter for years without 
seeking out doctors’ advice. 
Because both the drug prescription and drug purchase equations have binary outcomes I use 
the Heckman probit estimation (Heckprob in Stata), which is a censored probit, to estimate the 
selection model. The identification restriction in the selection equation is the average community 
prescription rate. This variable is highly correlated with the drug prescription, and not correlated with 
the elderly’s decision to purchase drugs. This instrument was tested as part of the preferred, jointly 
estimated method and passed the identification exclusion test (using the discrete factor analysis model 
with unobserved heterogeneity parameters).  
The use of the selection model in my study has its limitations. The selection model performs 
well if the portion of the sample in the outcome equation is large. This is not so in my dataset where 
only approximately 30 percent of elderly individuals were prescribed drugs. 70 percent of my sample 
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is thus censored and the outcome equation estimates are based on thirty percent of the sample. 
Further, the selection equation does not have a large explanatory power.  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
DATA 
 
5.1. Dataset 
The dataset used in this study is the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) Phase 
II.20 The survey gathers comprehensive information on income, health and medical care, both at the 
individual and household levels, and local infrastructure at the community level.  Household 
information is obtained from the household respondent and the individual-level data are collected 
from each household member by trained interviewers. Household members can provide answers on 
behalf of children and those unable to answer.  
RLMS is based on a nationally representative sample collected at 160 sites across the Russian 
Federation, which are assigned to 65 primary sampling units and 8 regions. Each year approximately 
4,000 households and between 8,700 and 10,000 individuals within these households are interviewed.  
The survey does not follow individuals or households who move out from the surveyed dwelling, but 
instead begins to interview any new families or individuals who move in the surveyed dwellings. A 
unique identification number is assigned to each household and individual making it possible to link 
them across multiple rounds.  
This study creates a panel of observations using seven survey rounds conducted in Nov.-Dec. 
1994 (Round 5), Oct.-Dec. 1995 (Round 6), Oct.-Dec. 1996 (Round 7), Oct.1998-Jan.1999 (Round 
8), Sept.-Dec. 2000 (Round 9), Sept.-Dec. 2001 (Round 10) and Sept.-Dec. 2002 (Round 11).  
                                                 
20
 The RLMS has been created and collected through a collaborative effort of the Carolina Population 
Center at UNC Chapel Hill and the Russian Academies of Sciences and Medical Sciences.   
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5.2. Sample Determination 
The sample used in this study consists of women who met the age requirement to receive 
pension, which is 55 years of age and up, and reported receiving pension at the time of the survey.   
In rounds 5 through 11 the RLMS collected a total of 17,013 person-year observations for 
men and women satisfying the age requirement for receiving pension.  262 person-year observations 
were dropped for individuals who were not receiving pension at the time of the interview and thus 
were not asked whether they received pension in the past 30 days.21 An additional 73 observations 
were dropped because of missing dependent variable data on health evaluation, drug prescription or 
drug purchase. Because the analysis focuses on the dynamic behavior, I then dropped individuals 
without the minimum of two consecutive observations and any observations that followed a skipped 
survey period.22 I dropped 5 individuals with missing height in all person-year observations.  
The sample at this point consisted of 3,405 individuals with 14,655 person-year observations. 
In order to test the household income pooling hypothesis more than one potential source of income in 
the household is needed. I therefore eliminated observations for 676 elderly individuals who lived 
alone or were the only adult in the household.    
The relationship between income and health should be studied separately for women and men 
because of different minimum age requirements for receiving pension as well as different health 
deterioration paths, as is evidenced for example in the WHO 2004 data on life expectancies at birth, 
which were 59 years for men and 72 years for women.23  I thus dropped all men and created a sample 
                                                 
21
 These 262 observations represent individuals who were not receiving pension at all. The reason is 
unknown – a possible reason is that they may not qualify to receive pension because they are foreigners or did 
not satisfy the service requirement. The sample does include individuals who reported receiving a pension (i.e. 
qualified for pension) but did not receive a payment in the past 30 days (pension arrear problem) and those who 
received a payment in the past 30 days but did not report the pension payment value (missing variables 
problem).   
  
22
  For example, if an individual participated in Rounds 6, 7, 9, 10 but skipped Round 8, I keep only 
observations from Rounds 6 and 7 and delete his observations from Rounds 9 and 10. 
 
23
  World Health Organization, http://www.who.int/countries/rus/en/ . 
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for women only. My final sample of women used in all empirical work in this study consists of 1782 
women with 7,283 person-year observations.     
In Table 5.1 I report the number of observations in the final sample across individual survey 
rounds, broken down between the first-time (initial condition) observations and time-t observations. 
For over 50 percent of women in this sample, the initial observation is from the RLMS Round 5 
conducted in 1994.  New individuals that were added to the sample in later time periods included 
women who just reached the minimum age requirement (55) to receive pension, women who moved 
into the surveyed dwellings and women who did not live consecutively with other adults in previous 
survey rounds.  Table 5.2 reports the number of observations per individual.    
 
Table 5.1: Observations per Survey Round 
 
 Total Number of 
Observations (IC 
and time t) 
Initial Condition 
(First Time) 
Observations 
Time-t Observations 
1. RLMS Round 5 (1994) 976 976 0 
2. RLMS Round 6 (1995) 1122 146 976 
3. RLMS Round 7 (1996) 1093 129 964 
4. RLMS Round 8 (1998) 1031 165 866 
5. RLMS Round 9 (2000) 1010 158 852 
6. RLMS Round J (2001) 1091 208 883 
7. RLMS Round K (2002) 960 0 960 
Total 7283 1792 5501 
 
 
Table 5.2: Observations per Individual 
 
 Number of 
Individuals 
2 observations 498 
3 observations 369 
4 observations 246 
5 observations 153 
 6 observations  127 
7 observations 371 
Total 1782 
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I replaced inconsistent or missing values for the gender and education explanatory variables 
with the mode of the variable calculated from all rounds the individual participated in the survey. I 
replaced missing values for pension income and household income variables with a zero, and created 
a missing variable indicator set to a 1 for observations with missing values.  5.7 % of household 
income data in the final sample is missing across all periods (Table 5.6). Household income measure 
used in this study was constructed by the RLMS by adding up individually reported incomes of 
household members and is missing if one of the household members did not answer the survey 
questions.  
In the mid 1990s, the Russian government fell behind in pension payments (and wages). The 
pension arrears problem culminated in 1996. Although the RLMS added direct questions about 
pension arrears only in later rounds, we could interpret the individuals’ response of not having 
received their pension in the past 30 days as a presence of pension arrears (as opposed to the response 
that they did receive pension but not disclosing the pension value). In such case the pension arrears 
would explain 95 percent of the missing pension values across all rounds. The coefficient on the 
missing variable indicator should be statistically insignificant if income is missing randomly. Because 
of its role as a proxy for pension arrears, in this study there may be a difference in the behavior of 
people with and without the missing pension if the elderly with pension arrears lowered their 
consumption or if the government delayed pension payments to the elderly in some systematic way 
correlated with their health.  No consistent differences between the subsamples with and without 
missing pension stand out in the descriptive Table 5.3.   
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Table 5.3: Observations with and without Missing Pension (Pension Arrears)  
Missing 
pension YES 
 NO 
 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002  1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 
Drugs 
prescribed  0.25 0.25 0.32 0.30 0.44 0.42 
 0.30 0.31 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.30 
     All drugs 
     Obtained 
0.50 0.74 0.61 0.83 0.63 1 
 
0.69 0.70 0.63 0.72 0.84 0.80 
Health good 
or average 0.46 0.55 0.58 0.60 0.44 0.63 
 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.58 0.58 
Lagged 
health 0.51 0.54 0.66 0.45 0.36 0.63 
 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.56 0.58 0.60 
              
Age 66.8 66.4 67.3 69.8 68.7 67.1  66.9 67.6 67.7 68.1 68.4 68.3 
Education up 
to 7 years 0.51 0.39 0.36 0.35 0.40 0.21 
 0.40 0.36 0.34 0.31 0.29 0.24 
Education 8 
yrs up to HS 0.25 0.29 0.26 0.35 0.16 0.37 
 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.27 
Education 
complete HS 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.36 0.42 
 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.32 
Education 
University  0.03 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.08 0.00 
 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.16 
Married 0.60 0.65 0.60 0.45 0.56 0.42  0.63 0.61 0.60 0.61 0.57 0.57 
Number of 
household 
members 
2.87 3.15 3.29 3.00 2.92 2.84 
 
3.08 3.01 2.96 3.01 3.01 3.01 
              
Observations 89 330 121 20 25 19  887 634 745 832 858 941 
Percent 9.1 34.2 14.0 2.3 2.8 2.0        
 
   Note: All values are percentages. 
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5.3. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
 
5.3.1. Outcome Variables: Health, Drug Prescription and Drug Purchase  
 
Health Outcome 
Defining and measuring health stock is challenging because of the multifaceted dimensions 
of health and measurement errors. Schultz (2001) notes that there is no consensus on how to 
conceptualize and measure an individual’s health status. Health scientists have used health indicators 
such as self-assessed health, activities of daily living (ADL) indexes, anthropometric measures (body 
mass index, height), self-reported morbidity measures, morbidity measures from administrative files, 
and mortality. The RLMS gathers several potential candidates for health status. Data collected 
directly from individuals provides information on self-assessed health, the extent of functional 
limitations, several chronic diseases and health problems incurred in the previous month. Weight and 
height and memory are measured by the interviewer.  Mortality, defined as death since the previous 
survey round, is reported by the main household survey respondent.  
This study uses self-assessed health as a proxy of health stock. Self-assessed health is a 
subjective and potentially noisy measure – it is unclear against what benchmark various elderly 
compare their health, and perception of average health can also be influenced by conditioning 
experiences of the individual. On the other hand, it describes the overall health of the individual and 
reflects the individual’s perception of how important various aspects of her health-related wellbeing 
are. Deaton and Paxson (1998) use it as a single measure of health in their study of income and health 
relationship. They note that it reflects information individuals have about their health that is 
unobserved by physicians, and that it correlates with mortality.  In the sample used in this study, 
elderly women with bad self-assessed health had a higher prevalence of chronic diseases and more 
problems with activities of daily living (Table 5.4). 
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Table 5.4: Summary Statistics: Illness Prevalence and ADL problems  
in Self-assessed Health Groups 
 
 
 Good or Average 
Health 
Bad  
Health 
Ever diagnosed with diabetes or increased sugar 
in the blood 
0.07 0.17 
Ever experienced pain in your rib cage 0.65 0.84 
Ever diagnosed with a myocardial infarction 0.03 0.09 
Ever diagnosed with stroke (blood hemorrhage in 
the brain) 0.02 0.07 
Diagnosed with anemia in the last 12 months 0.03 0.06 
   
Problems with Activities of Daily Living  
(Scale 1-5; 1 =not at all difficult; 5 =cannot do it):   
   Walk about a kilometer 2.22 3.66 
   Walk about 200 meters 1.61 2.70 
   Walk across the room 1.23 2.07 
   Sit for two hours 1.62 2.36 
   Stand up after sitting for an extended period 1.86 2.70 
   Get up from a bed unassisted 1.24 1.96 
   Climb one flight of stairs without resting 1.65 2.87 
   Lift and carry abt 5 kg (a sack of vegetables) 1.91 3.16 
   Squat, crouch or kneel 2.64 3.87 
   Take a shower or bath unassisted 1.26 2.23 
   Eat unassisted 1.01 1.26 
   Dress unassisted 1.07 1.60 
   Comb your hair unassisted 1.05 1.40 
   Use the toilet unassisted 1.04 1.50 
 
 Note: Values across all periods are recorded. 
 
 
The RLMS asks the respondents to evaluate their health in the following way:  “Tell me, 
please, how would you evaluate your health?” The respondent chooses between (1) very good, (2) 
good, (3) average, not good but not bad, (4) bad, (5) very bad. Very few elderly women think highly 
of their health:  across all time periods in this study, only 0.2 percent considered their health to be 
very good and an additional 3.5 percent good. About 51 percent of the elderly women assessed their 
health as average, 35 percent bad, and 10 percent very bad. Per-period distribution of self-assessed 
health is reported in Table 5.5. 
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In this study I use a dichotomous self-assessed health outcome variable, in which I merge 
categories (1), (2) and (3) to represent “good” or “average” health, and I merge categories (4) and (5) 
to represent “bad” health.24 There has been an upward trend in the sample in the reported self-
assessed health (Table 5.5). In 2002, 58.3 percent of women evaluated their health as good or 
average, up from 53.5 percent of women in 1995. 
 
Drug Prescription 
Drug prescription is a dichotomous variable constructed from the survey question “Tell me, 
please, in the last 30 days did a physician or some other specialist at a medical institution – hospital, 
polyclinic – write  a prescription or advise you to take some kind of medicine?” The variable name 
‘drug prescription’ is used throughout this study, but it stands both for drug prescription and drug 
recommendation. At the time of the study, many drugs typically prescribed in the US needed to be 
only ‘recommended’ by Russian doctors (e.g. scribbled on a piece of paper), including antibiotics, but 
the prescription was not required for filling the drug in the pharmacy. An official doctor prescription 
was required by pharmacists only for dispensing of opiates and drugs eligible for government 
discounts.  
                                                 
24
  I considered employing alternative measures of health stock in the empirical model, such as 
measures of functional status and chronic disease. Per Schultz (2001) measures of limitations in performing 
activities of daily living (ADL) appear to approximate health states among elderly and reduce bias in measuring 
health of people with lower socio-economic status. The ADL scale that is used to assess the difficulty of 
performing everyday tasks, such as bathing, dressing, using the toilet, eating and transferring, was introduced by 
Katz (1963). I created a similar index using the RLMS data and the Russian context that incorporates responses 
on help needed with bathing, dressing, eating, using toilet, walking across a room, and climbing stairs. I then 
used the index to create an ADL dummy that singles out physically impaired elderly from the rest of the elderly. 
In each of the surveyed years, close to 20 percent of the sample found it at least somewhat difficult to do one or 
more of these activities. I chose not to use this measure in this study because it was not collected in 2001. 
      I also created but did not use a chronic disease dummy that equals one if the individual was ever 
diagnosed with diabetes, increased sugar in blood, myocardial infarction, or a stroke (blood hemorrhage in the 
brain). The RLMS includes information on the year of the diagnosis, which leads to another potential definition 
based on the diagnosis in the last calendar year. The last potential health stock measure, used by Jensen and 
Kaspar (2003), is a dummy measuring chest pain, which indicates potential heart problems. The dummy equals 
to one if the persons has experienced strong pains in the chest, lasting half an hour or more, in the last 12 
months.   
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On average, about 30 percent of women in the sample were prescribed or recommended 
drugs in years 1995 to 2002 (Table 5.5). 
 
Table 5.5: Summary Statistics: Outcome Variables 
 1994 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 
 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8 Round 9 Round J Round K 
Outcome Variables        
 
       
Health good or average at 
the end of period 
 
Na 53.5 53.9 53.5 55.2 57.5 58.3 
Drugs prescribed or 
recommended 
Na 29.1 28.5 28.9 30.3 30.5 29.8 
        
    Sample Size 0 976 964 866 852 883 960 
        
        
All drugs obtained 
(conditional on drugs 
being prescribed) 
Na 67.6 71.3 62.8 72.5 82.9 80.4 
        
    Sample Size 0 284 275 250 258 269 286 
        
 
Survey Responses Used to Construct Dichotomous Outcome Variables Above: 
 
Health Outcome: 
       
Very good or good  3.7 4.3 3.7 3.5 2.7 3.6 
Average  49.8 49.7 49.8 51.6 54.8 54.5 
Bad  38.4 35.9 37.2 33.5 33.6 32.9 
Very bad  8.1 10.2 9.3 11.4 8.8 8.7 
        
Drug Purchase:        
   All Drugs Purchased  67.6 71.3 62.8 72.5 82.9 80.4 
   Some Drugs Purchased  9.9 13.1 18.0 9.7 5.2 4.9 
   No Drugs Purchased  22.5 15.6 19.2 17.8 11.9 14.7 
   
 Note: All values are percentages, reported for time t equations. 
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Drug Purchase 
If the respondent answered yes to having drugs prescribed or recommended to her, she was 
then asked several questions about drug purchasing behavior. I used two survey questions: “Were you 
able to find or buy some of these medicines?” and  ”Tell, me please, were there any medicines 
prescribed or recommended for you in the last 30 days that you were not able to find or buy?” to 
construct the measure of access to drugs used in this study. “Drug purchase” is a dichotomous 
variable reflecting the decision between obtaining all versus not all medicines.  It is possible to create 
a variable with three categories for “none” vs. “some” vs. “all” drugs purchased or obtained, but it is 
unclear how to interpret the meaning of the response of not being able to buy any versus at least some 
of the drugs if we don’t know how many drugs were prescribed.    
The probability of purchase of all prescribed drugs fluctuated during the studied period 
(Table 5.5). It was lowest in 1998 (62.8 percent) during the financial crisis. Other than 1998, the 
probability of purchasing all drugs increased every time period from 67.6 percent in 1995 to 82.9 in 
2001 and then fell slightly to 80.4 percent in 2002.    
 
5.3.2. Policy Variables: Income  
Pension income used in this study is reported in the RLMS by each individual as “pension 
received in the past 30 days.”   
The RLMS provides two measures of total household income. One is the total household 
income reported by the main household respondent in the household questionnaire. The error margin 
on the household respondent’s estimate of “what was the monetary income of your entire family in 
the last 30 days?” could be large, making it more likely to accept the null hypotheses 1 and 3 in 
Section 3 that income does not improve access to health investment or lead to better health. To 
mitigate this measurement error I use a more precise measure constructed by the RLMS by adding 
labor income, pension income and unemployment benefits reported by individual household members 
and additional household-level income from other government transfers, home production, gifts and 
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such obtained from the main household respondent. I also employed different definitions of non-labor 
income, but these did not make a difference in estimation.  
Income measures used are the real values with the base month December 2000.25 Both real 
pension income and real total household income fell from its largest values (rubles 1,132.78 and 
4,467.59 respectively) in 1994 by 42 percent during the 1998 financial crisis marked by 
hyperinflation, but rebounded in 2000 and 2001 to rubles 1051.14 (pension) and 3652.17 (total 
household income). 
It is likely that income does not have a linear effect on health and health investment. The 
effect of the rubles in the first quartile of income might be larger than the effect of rubles in the last 
quartile of income. Thus, I explore both linear and non-linear measures of income, which include the 
logarithmic transformation where the effect of each additional dollar decreases as income increases, 
and spline functions that allow us to estimate a different marginal effect of the additional ruble within 
each quartile.  
Pension arrears plagued 35 percent of the elderly during the 1996 pension crisis and might 
have had repercussions for access to health care and health outcomes. Pension arrears are an example 
of unanticipated transitory change in income, and are represented in the model by a dummy standing 
for their presence. People who did not receive pension but knew that this condition is temporary and 
the government would pay them with delay, may not alter their consumption behavior (lifecycle 
theory). 
                                                 
25
 In December 2000 (Round 9), the exchange rate was approximately 28 rubles per dollar. The 
exchange rate was approximately 30 rubles per dollar in late 2001 (Round 10), and as of 12/27/07 
approximately 25 rubles per dollar.  
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Table 5.6: Summary Statistics: Individual and Household Explanatory Variables  
 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 
    Sample Size 976 964 866 852 883 960 
Policy Variables:       
   Pension Income 813.13 681.33 616.45 770.48 954.37 1091.68 
Standard Error [379.46] [547.63] [305.63] [248.85] [367.94] [390.11] 
   Pension Arrears /missing 9.1% 34.2% 14.0% 2.3% 2.8% 2.0% 
   If pension not missing 894.7164 1035.967 716.5656 789.01 982.17 1113.72 
Standard Error [292.19] [297.10] [191.73] [220.87] [334.64] [361.50] 
       
   Total Household Income 3724.41 3609.35 2981.11 3561.32 4298.96 4903.30 
Standard Error [3007.33] [3908.84] [2567.59] [3425.87] [3933.59] [5041.61] 
    Missing Household Inc. 4.8% 5.9% 5.1% 6.3% 5.5% 6.6% 
       
Individual and Household Characteristics: 
 Sample Size 976 964 866 852 883 960 
Age 66.93 67.19 67.63 68.13 68.37 68.24 
      Standard Error [8.73] [8.66] [8.26] [7.90] [8.14] [8.12] 
Lagged health 54.9% 55.8% 59.2% 55.9% 57.4% 60.2% 
Education up to 7 years 40.8% 36.8% 33.8% 30.8% 29.4% 24.4% 
Education 8 yrs up to HS 25.0% 27.2% 27.8% 28.9% 28.5% 26.9% 
Education HS completed 23.9% 24.6% 26.7% 28.5% 29.2% 32.5% 
Education University co. 10.3% 11.4% 11.7% 11.9% 12.8% 15.9% 
Living arrangement:       
  Spouse, no other adults 37.4% 36.8% 38.5% 39.4% 38.3% 36.8% 
  Spouse, adults, no child 3.6% 4.0% 4.3% 2.8% 2.8% 3.2% 
  Spouse & adult child 17.9% 17.7% 14.8% 15.3% 14.0% 15.1% 
   No spouse, adults, no 
child 
7.6% 7.7% 6.7% 5.8% 7.0% 8.0% 
   No spouse & adult child 29.9% 30.2% 33.4% 34.0% 35.7% 35.4% 
 
   Note:  All values other than pension and household income measures and age are percentage, reported for time-t 
equations. 
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5.3.3. Other Explanatory Variables 
 
Individual and Household Variables 
The education proxy was constructed using several RLMS questions on grades completed 
and diplomas received.26 In 1994, 45 percent of participants had less than 7 years of education, 24 
percent completed 7 or more years of school but did not graduate from high school, 21 percent 
graduated from high school but did not receive a university level diploma, and 10 percent received a 
university level diploma. Average education attainment increased over time. 
Age effects are measured using the squared transformation (age squared) because it allows 
the effect of one-year increase in age to change as a person gets older. The effect of age on is not 
likely to remain the same as we get older. Increasing age might have a positive effect on drug 
purchase in the fifties, even out later, and maybe even become negative in very old age.  
Height is the most common and readily available indicator or early childhood and adolescent 
health. Adult person’s height is affected by the environment and nutrition of mother and child and 
conditions during adolescent growth (Schultz 2001).  This relationship might be more applicable in 
developing than developed countries. Russian women in this sample were born prior to 1945, and 
thus were very likely to have spent their early childhood facing serious resource constraints – whether 
it was during WWII or the years beforehand. While height does not substantially change between 25 
and 55 years of age, it is negatively correlated with the elderly people’s age. Introduction of an 
interaction variable that measures the effect of height for different age eliminates the bias caused by 
this correlation.27    
                                                 
26
 The Soviet definition of primary school changed several times over time, and until 1956 the required 
education was 7 years. The spike at seven years of education suggests that for elderly Russians in the sample 7 
years of education was a milestone. The number of people with 7 grades completed was almost five times 
higher than the number of people with 6 grades, and three times higher than the number of people with 8 grades. 
 
27
 Use of interaction terms of height with ethnicity and place of birth is unfeasible because these 
variables have many missing values in the RLMS.  
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The household level control variables reflect the household living arrangement: whether the 
individual lives with a spouse, an adult biological child, or other adults, as well as the number of 
household members in the retired category and working category, and children under 18.  
 
Table 5.7: Summary Statistics: Community Level Explanatory Variables 
 
 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 
Sample Size  976 964 866 852 883 960 
 
Instrument       
 
Average drug prescription 
rate 
Eq. 2 29.2 29.2 28.9 28.9 28.7 29.1 
        
Average drug discount 
eligibility rate 
Eq.2,3 59.1 56.0 50.4 43.1 44.7 46.2 
        
Average drug discount size 
rate 
Eq.2,3 84.5 85.9 81.9 79.5 80.8 82.3 
        
Average Rate drugs not in 
pharmacy – fixed, elderly 
Eq.2,3 51.5 51.6 51.7 51.4 51.5 51.3 
        
Average Rate drugs not in 
pharmacy – time-specific, 
responses from all adults 
Eq.2,3 66.1 49.2 38.8 27.2 27.1 21.7 
        
Average rate of health 
problems reported 
 41.9 42.5 41.4 43.0 44.3 43.1 
        
Average rate of  medical 
provider visit to treat 
health problem 
 40.5 40.7 40.8 37.3 28.7 30.4 
Average prevention visit 
rate 
 14.7 13.2 12.8 14.8 17.7 15.5 
        
Average hospitalization 
rate 
 4.9 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.3 4.9 
        
 
   Note: All values are percentages. 
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Community Variables 
The characteristics of the community in which the individual lives may also affect medical 
care use, access to drugs and health outcomes. To proxy the community characteristics I created time-
specific, community-level average rates for 38 primary sampling units that include: (1) average 
hospitalization rate, (2) average prevention rate, (3) average rate of health problems reported, (4) 
average rate of a medical provider visit in case of a health problem, (5) average drug prescription rate, 
(6) average drug discount eligibility rate, (7) average drug discount size rate, (8) two definitions of 
the average rate at which the reason “drugs not available in pharmacy” was given by patients who did 
not obtain all drugs. The algorithms excluded the observation for which the average rates were 
computed. The rates were based on the sample of the elderly used in this study and on the sample of 
all individuals living in the community, who are older than 18 years.   
Community average rates (1) – (4) may be determinants of all outcome variables: drug 
prescription, drug purchasing behavior and health state because they reflect overall health of 
population in the community (may be influenced e.g. by local pollution level), accessibility of local 
medical care institutions and local medical care-seeking conventions.  For example, areas with high 
average hospitalizations, prevention and treatment visit rates might signal that the area has many or 
easily accessible hospitals and polyclinics. That in turn could mean that people are more likely to seek 
out medical care with less severe health problems than people in areas with low utilization rates and 
then doctors are less likely to prescribe drugs. Of course, one could argue the other way: high 
utilization rates might be an indication of an unhealthy population. Either way, the market 
characteristics proxied by average regional rates would affect the doctor’s propensity to prescribe 
drugs.   
The probability of drug prescription may depend also on the conventions in the area where 
the doctor (or other medical worker) works. I use the average community-level rate of drug 
prescriptions (5) as a proxy for the doctors’ environment. Community average rates (6) – (8) may 
affect the drug prescribing and drug purchasing behaviors. The elderly women would be more likely 
  55 
to obtain drugs in areas with generous local drug discount eligibility rules and fewer drug supply 
problems in pharmacies. According to Minkevich (1998) Russian doctors consider drug price and 
availability when prescribing or recommending drugs to patients. To capture such effect on doctors’ 
propensity to prescribe drugs, I use the average community-level rate of reported “drugs not available 
in pharmacy,” average drug discount eligibility and discount size rate as explanatory variables also in 
the drug prescription.  
Time dummies, regional dummies and interactions of time and region further help control for 
time-varying community-level changes, such as changes in local infrastructure and prices, which 
affect household resources, health and health drug utilization outcome variables. Stillman & Thomas 
(2006) used region-time interactions but found that their inclusion did not affect the main results. 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS 
 
The preferred model jointly estimates the empirical equations describing drug prescription, 
drug purchase and health status. It accounts for the existence of unobserved individual permanent 
characteristics correlated across all equations by modeling unobserved individual heterogeneity.  
In Section 6.1, I describe selected coefficients and marginal effects in individual equations of 
the preferred jointly estimated model and compare them to estimates obtained using alternative, 
exogenous-health methods: (i) an exogenous model that treats all variables as exogenous, (ii) an 
instrumental variable model with a selection model used in the first stage, and (iii) an instrumental 
variable model with a two-part model used in the first stage. I then investigate if the estimates change 
when alternative income definitions (spline functions) and income interactions with lagged health and 
living arrangement are used.   
The preferred model’s structural character allows us to model dynamic behavior at the level 
of the set of equations in addition to evaluating results at the individual equation level, and makes it 
possible to find and simulate total income effects that affect the drug purchasing behavior and the 
health production simultaneously. Such simulations can provide useful insights for policy makers.  In 
Section 6.2, I report results at the set of equations level. I discuss the goodness of fit of the preferred 
model, test theoretical hypotheses, and simulate effects of policy changes similar to the 2005 Russian 
law, which replaced drug discount subsidies with cash transfers directed to pensioners.  
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6.1. Equation-Specific Coefficient Estimates in the Preferred Model 
 
6.1.1. Drug Prescription Equation 
Drug prescription is a dichotomous variable - equal to one if the woman reported having any 
drugs prescribed or recommend to her in a medical institution in 30 days prior to the survey 
interview; otherwise it is equal to zero. This variable reflects not only the physician’s decision to 
prescribe or recommend drugs, but also the patient’s decision whether or not to seek care in a medical 
institution.  
In the preferred, jointly estimated model with log income measures I find little evidence of 
income effects. A pension increase of 100 rubles increases the probability of having drugs prescribed 
by 0.07 percent, or a pension increase of 400 rubles (which was between 35 and 50 percent of the 
average real pension income during the studied period) increases the drug prescription probability by 
0.28 percent (Table 6.1). The effect of the household income is statistically insignificant and even 
smaller in magnitude than the pension effect.  
The lack of evidence of income effects of any substantial magnitude on the drug prescription 
behavior could be explained by the presence of the universal health care system in Russia. Russians 
were officially entitled to free medical care, in which case income should not be expected to play a 
role in the patient’s decision to seek medical care. But in the real world of Russian health care, it 
could. Policlinics and hospitals suffered from insufficient government funding and some reacted by 
instituting out-of-pocket fees for services such as X-ray tests, in spite of the official free care 
guarantee. A lot of attention has also been paid to under-the-table, unofficial payments to doctors in 
Russia. This study’s results imply that if such out-of-pocket official and unofficial out-of-pocket 
payments for medical care were present, they made very little difference in the elderly women’s 
likelihood of having drugs prescribed. 
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Table 6.1: Marginal Effects – Drug Prescription and Drug Purchase Equations: (i) Exogenous Model, 
(ii) Selection Model, (iii) Preferred, Jointly Estimated Model 
 
 
  
Drug Prescription 
  
Drug Purchase 
        
 
 
(i) 
Exogen. 
(ii) 
Selection 
(iii) 
Joint 
 (i) 
Exogen. 
(ii) 
Selection 
(iii) 
Joint 
 
       
Pension (10 ruble increase both in 
pension and household income) 
 
.00073** .00073** .00072**     .00016 .00003     .00013 
Household Income (10 ruble 
increase, but no pension increase) 
 
-.00026 -.00026 -.00015  .00045 .00033     .00037 
Lagged health status (rated as 
average or better) 
 
-.173** -.172** .0465      .0791** .0791     -.00007 
Age (increase by 1 year) 
 
.0036** .0036** .0081**     .0033 .0030     .0011 
Education – university degree 
 
 
   -.0926* -.0744     -.0634* 
Community prescription rate 
(10% increase) 
 
.0941** .0953** .0708**        
Community drug eligibility rate 
(10% increase) 
 
.0008 .0008 -.0007      .0223** .0251**     .0187** 
Community drug unavailability 
rate (10% increase) 
 
.0112 .0113 .0123*      -.0218* -.0203     -.0256** 
Community health problem 
reported rate (10% increase) 
 
-.0298** -.0301** -.0166      .0319* .0364     .0223 
Community doctor visit rate to 
treat health problem (10% 
increase) 
 
-.0175 -.0176     -.0057      .0540* .0609**     .0440** 
Community preventive visit rate 
(10% increase) 
 
.0546** .0541**     .0433**      -.1106** -.1035     -.0970** 
Rural Area vs. Urban Area 
 
 
.0107     .0147       .0141    .0317 
 
 
Notes:   ** significant at 5 percent level 
* significant at 10 percent level 
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If the small pension income effect is driven by the patient’s decision to seek out medical care, 
then the lack of any significant household income effect suggests that households do not pool 
resources in allocation decisions with regard to medical care consumption. 
The lack of income effects on drug prescription could also occur if Russian doctors do not 
induce demand for drugs for higher-income patients who are more able to pay nor withhold drug 
prescriptions from those with low income. The statistically significant, albeit very small, positive 
pension income effect might indicate that doctors are able to assess the patient’s pension income and 
are slightly more likely to prescribe drugs to patients with higher pension.  
Income effects found in the preferred, jointly estimated model are similar to income effects 
found in the exogenous model and the selection model (Table 6.1), which implies that unobserved 
characteristics modeled in the preferred model are not correlated with income, contingent on having 
drugs prescribed. The model with a log pension income spline function indicates that the pension 
income effect is non-linear: only an additional ruble in the lowest (first) and highest (fourth) pension 
income quartiles increases the probability of drug prescription (Table A.2).28   
The positive effect of the missing pension income dummy is intriguing because this variable 
mostly reflects the presence of pension arrears (Table A.1). People who did not receive a pension 
check from the government the month of the survey were more likely to seek out medical care and 
have drugs prescribed - maybe the stress of not having any current income flow and the uncertainty 
surrounding the next payment could have made them more susceptible to onsets of illnesses.  
 (Table 6.1). In the two models with exogenous lagged health, the probability of having drugs 
prescribed was 17 percentage points higher for a person with bad lagged self-assessed health 
compared to a person with good or average lagged health. Once we treat lagged health as an 
endogenous variable in the preferred model, affected by the same unobserved permanent 
characteristics of the individual as her drug prescription and drug purchasing behavior, it leads to a 
                                                 
28
  Interactions of income with lagged health and two living arrangement dummies (being married and 
living with an adult child) were statistically insignificant. Adding them to the model did not change the main 
results (Table A.2).  
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4.6 percent increase in the probability of having drugs prescribed or recommended while the effect of 
unobserved heterogeneity is negative. The effect attributed to lagged health in alternative models 
becomes captured by unobserved characteristics variable in the preferred model. These unobserved 
characteristics likely include positive attitudes to health care and perhaps a more accurate 
approximation of the individual’s health. The sum of the observed self-assessed health and 
unobserved health characteristics effects is negative. 
Three proxies for characteristics of the community in which the elderly woman lives affect 
the drug prescription probability.29 The community’s average drug prescription rate serves as a proxy 
for the doctor’s propensity to prescribe drugs, and as such it reflects the effect of the local geographic 
area conventions – both patient expectations and institutional influences on the doctor (for example, 
though marketing of pharmaceutical companies). The average drug prescription rate increases the 
probability of drug prescription by 7 percentage points, indicating that doctors are influenced by the 
conventions in their area (Table 6.1). The probability of drug prescription is also higher in 
communities with higher average rates of preventive visits and in communities where individuals 
were more likely to report not being able to find prescribed drugs in pharmacies (Table 6.1).  Out of 
demographic characteristics, age increases the likelihood of drug prescription (Table 6.1). 
 
6.1.2. Drug Purchase Equation 
Drug Purchase is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the individual reported obtaining all 
drugs prescribed or recommend to her, and equal to zero if she did not obtain at least some of the 
drugs in 30 days prior to the survey. Only those individuals who were prescribed or recommended to 
obtain drugs were included in the subsample asked questions about drug purchasing behavior.  
Neither household income nor pension income had a statistically significant direct effect on 
the elderly women’s decision to obtain drugs, conditional on having drugs prescribed. This lack of 
                                                 
29
 Computation of all average community rates were individual-specific and excluded the answer of the 
individual.   
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income effects was present also in the alternative selection and exogenous models (Table 6.1). 30  
When log household income is replaced with a log household income spline function in the preferred 
model, we can detect a positive, statistically significant effect (10 percent level) of the additional 
ruble in the 4th quartile (Table A.4). This suggests that the decision to purchase drugs is influenced by 
income only at high income levels - maybe because people with highest income levels are treated 
differently by doctors and get more types of drugs prescribed or recommended to them and are more 
critical of doctors’ choices and thus more selective about whether to obtain all drugs.  
Considering the fact that from 29 percent (1994) to 67 percent (2002) of the surveyed 
elderly women who did not obtain all drugs often reported not having enough money as one 
of the reasons – (similar to the range from 20 percent of urban Russians in 1994 to 66 percent in 
2000 in the WHO 2003 report on Russia, based on the RLMS data), the lack of income effect in this 
study is an unexpected finding. The lack of the relationship between income and the decision to 
obtain all prescribed or recommended drugs may indicate that drugs are viewed as a necessity by the 
participants of this survey. It may be that a lower income would lead people to forgo purchases of 
expensive foods such as meat or discretionary items such as clothing rather than drugs that were 
prescribed or recommended to them. It is also possible that this study cannot capture the income 
effect well enough because the drug purchase outcome variable represents a very heterogeneous 
group of drugs associated with a wide range of prices as well as different perceptions of necessity and 
thus different income elasticity.  
Using the RLMS data I cannot address the research questions using only one specific, 
homogenous drug. However, I can postulate that drugs prescribed or recommended to elderly women 
in the RLMS are quite likely to be for relatively serious conditions and thus likely to be perceived as a 
                                                 
30
 In exploratory exogenous and selection model estimations, in which I used a larger sample of 
women (before deleting those who lived alone and had non-consecutive observations), I found statistically 
significant income effects, but of very small magnitude. The magnitude was similar to the magnitude of the 
effects in the exogenous and selection models reported in Table 6.1 (albeit in Table 6.1 these effects were found 
to be statistically insignificant).  
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necessity, which could partially explain the very inelastic demand with respect to income. Russians 
did not need a prescription in order to purchase the majority of over-the-counter drugs, including 
antibiotics, and thus had less incentive to seek out medical care and visit a doctor. Those individuals 
who reported having drugs prescribed or recommended in a medical institution must have sought out 
medical care, which would be more likely if they had a relatively serious health condition and viewed 
drugs as a necessity. This notion is supported by the fact that individuals with most serious co-
morbidities were granted the “invalid” status which qualified them for drug discounts but required 
them to obtain a prescription refill for discounted drugs. Consequently, people with bad self-assessed 
health who are more likely to have chronic diseases and ADL problems (Table 5.4) are heavily 
represented in the subsample of people with drugs prescribed, contributing to the estimated lack of 
income effects.   
In models treating lagged health as exogenous, people in average or good lagged self-
assessed health were 7.9 percent more likely to purchase prescribed drugs than those in bad health 
(Table 6.1). Once we endogenize health in the preferred model, then this effect becomes insignificant, 
and is picked up by the positive coefficient on individual unobserved heterogeneity. This implies that 
there is no systematic difference between the drug purchasing decisions of the elderly women with 
average/good self-assessed lagged health versus bad health, contingent on having drugs 
recommended or prescribed by a physician. The unobserved health and attitudes capture the 
difference in drug purchasing behavior. I explore the different behavior of groups with good versus 
bad health in more depth in Section 6.4 of this chapter. 
Women with a university education were less likely to purchase all prescribed drugs than 
women with lower education, maybe because they felt more knowledgeable about their health 
condition and able to second guess the doctor’s decision. The study found no effect of age on drug 
purchasing behavior. 
Several community characteristics seem to be important determinants of the drug purchasing 
behavior (Table 6.1). Women were more likely to obtain all drugs if they lived in an area with more 
  63 
generous drug discount eligibility rules (i.e. higher percentage of people in their area qualified for 
discounts) and in an area where people were more likely to visit a doctor if they had a health problem. 
Women were less likely to obtain all drugs if they lived in an area with more substantial drug supply 
problems in pharmacies (proxied by the percentage of people who reported not being able to find a 
drug in the pharmacy) or in an area with a higher rate of preventive visits.  
 
6.1.3. Health Outcome Equation 
The health status outcome is a dichotomous variable based on the individual’s self assessment 
of health;  it is  equal to one if the individual reported an average or good health at the end of the 
period and equal to zero if the individual reported being in bad health.  
Both pension income and household income have positive direct effects on the health 
outcome (Tables A.7 and A.8). The magnitudes of these effects are small, in line with the very small 
income-health gradient found in Russia by past research (Lokhsin & Ravallion 2008). A 100 ruble 
increase in household income that is not caused by an increase in the elderly woman’s pension leads 
to a 0.05 percentage point increase in the elderly woman’s probability of being in good health. A 100 
ruble increase in the elderly woman’s pension income leads to a 0.1 percentage point increase in her 
probability of being in good health. The fact that pension income has a stronger marginal effect on 
health than household income suggests that the source of income matters in the household allocation 
of resources regarding health production of individual members. An increase in pension income may 
increase the elderly woman’s bargaining power within the household and allow her to allocate more 
resources to improve her health.  
Direct income effects are comparable across the preferred jointly estimated model, 
instrumental variables models and the exogenous model (Table 6.2). The extension of the model with 
log household income spline function indicates that the effects of household income are nonlinear. 
The positive effect of a ruble increase in the first quartile has the highest magnitude (Table A.4).  
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 Lagged health is a crucial predictor of the elderly woman’s current health. In models that 
treat lagged health as exogenous, those with good or average lagged health are 41 percent more likely 
to be in good or average health also at the end of the period.  Once we endogenize lagged health in 
the preferred model, this effect falls to 24 percent. Unobserved heterogeneity modeled in the 
preferred model thus is responsible for part of the effect attributed to lagged health in models treating 
lagged health as exogenous.  The difference between the effects of lagged health in the preferred 
model and models treating it as exogenous highlights the importance of endogenizing health. 
Receiving a drug prescription is a predictor of worse health outcome for women with good or 
average lagged health but it does not have an effect on women already in bad lagged health. While the 
decision to obtain all drugs did not affect health of elderly women with bad lagged health, it did make 
a difference in the health outcome of women with good or average lagged health. If a healthy woman 
obtained all prescribed or recommended drugs then her descent into the bad health state was slowed 
down by 10 percentage points, compared to a healthy woman who did not purchase all prescribed or 
recommended drugs. This implies that drug therapy may be effective in health maintenance of the 
elderly people.  
 The likelihood of maintaining good or average health is higher for women with higher 
education and falls with age (Table 6.2). The likelihood of maintaining good or average health also 
falls if the elderly woman lives in a rural area or in an area with high rates of reported health 
problems. It increases if the elderly woman lives in an area with a high rate of doctor visits to treat a 
health problem or in an area with a high preventive visit rate. These results indicate that policies that 
improve access to medical care may be effective in improving or maintaining health of the elderly 
women in Russia.  
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Table 6.2: Marginal Effects – Health Status Equation: (i) Exogenous Model, (ii) Two-part Model,  
 (iii) Selection Model, (iv) Preferred, Jointly Estimated Model 
 
 Health Status  
 
 Models with Exogenous Health Preferred 
      (i) 
Exogenous 
    (ii) 
Two-Part 
   (iii) 
Selection 
 (iv) 
Joint 
Pension (10 ruble increase both in pension and 
household income) 
 
.0011** .0011** .0011** .0010** 
Household Income (10 ruble increase, but no 
pension increase) 
 
.0005** .0005** .0005** .0005** 
Lagged health status (Average or better = 1) 
 
 
.4093** .4179** .4069** .2417** 
Drug prescribed/recommended (i.e. bad health 
get a rx) 
 
-.2096** -.2094** -.0918 -.0379 
Drugs obtained (i.e. bad health get a rx and 
take all vs. bad health who did not get rx) 
 
-.1863 -.1694 -.0615 -.0666 
Drug prescribed* good lagged health (i.e. 
good health get a rx vs good health who did 
not get rx) 
 
-.3526* -.5239** -.3829* -.1720** 
Dugs obtained* good lagged health (i.e. good 
health get a rx and take all vs. good lagged 
health who did not get rx) 
 
-.2002** -.1368** -.1964** -.0738** 
Age (increase by 1 year) 
 
-.0111** -.0117*** -.0121** -.0148** 
Education – high school vs lowest 
 
.0334** .0356** .0325* .0383** 
Education – university degree vs lowest 
 
.0522** .0682** .0730** .0771** 
Community health problem reported rate (10% 
increase) 
 
-.0237** -.0267** -.0291** -.0275** 
Community doctor visit rate to treat health 
problem (10% increase) 
 
.0178** .0178* .0124 .0158* 
Community preventive visit rate 
(10% increase) 
 
.0278* .0321** .0376 .0267* 
Lives in rural area -.0319** -.0323** -.0338** -.0290** 
 
** significant at 5 percent level 
 * significant at 10 percent level 
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6.1.4. Unobserved Heterogeneity Factor Loadings in Individual Equations 
The differences between the effects of lagged health, drug prescription and drug purchase 
estimated in the preferred model and the alternative models are evidence that modeling unobserved 
heterogeneity is important. In the preferred model, unobserved heterogeneity had a positive effect on 
drug purchase and the health outcome and a negative effect on drug prescription. Based on these 
results, the components of unobserved permanent individual characteristics most likely driving the 
unobserved heterogeneity variable effect are some positive health dimensions, risk aversion to bad 
health and positive attitudes toward the health care system.  
 
6.2. Choosing the Preferred Model and the Goodness of Fit 
In order to find he preferred model using the discrete factor analysis method, I jointly 
estimated the set of equations for different specifications of permanent and time-variant unobserved 
heterogeneity, trying out between one and four mass points for both unobserved heterogeneity 
distributions.  I compared the goodness of fit of models with alternative mass point specifications and 
assessed the accompanying changes in the endogenous coefficients and the log-likelihood using the 
likelihood ratio test.  
I chose the model with four permanent heterogeneity mass points and without any time-
variant heterogeneity as the preferred model because adding more mass points did not improve log 
likelihood significantly. The distribution of the permanent unobserved heterogeneity in the preferred 
model is summarized in Table A.5. The placement of the normalized mass points was estimated to be 
at 0.0, 0.43, 0.70 and 1.0. On this 0 to 1 scale, the elderly woman’s unobserved characteristics would 
be represented by the value 0.0 with a 3 percent probability, 0.43 with a 25 percent probability, 0.7 
with a 52 percent probability and 1.0 with a 20 percent probability. I found that adding the time-
variant individual unobserved heterogeneity did not lead to an improvement of the model’s goodness 
of fit or the likelihood. Therefore I did not include the time-variant heterogeneity in the preferred 
model specification. 
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To assess the goodness of fit, I compared means of the predicted outcome variables to means 
of the outcome variables observed in real life. To generate the predicted outcomes, I used coefficients 
estimated in the preferred model, which included both coefficients for the observed explanatory 
variables and coefficients (loadings) for the unobserved permanent heterogeneity as well as the mass 
points representing permanent unobserved heterogeneity, also estimated in the model. In computation 
of the predicted probabilities, unobserved heterogeneity coefficients were multiplied by randomly 
assigned mass points. I drew random errors to assign the predicted outcome value of zero or one: if 
the random error was larger than the predicted probability then the simulated binary outcome was 
assigned the value one; otherwise the simulated outcome was zero.  In each period, I replaced 
observed endogenous explanatory variables with the last period’s predicted outcomes and then 
computed a new set of predicted outcomes for the current period. I generated 100 predicted outcomes 
per observation, each with a different set of random errors used to assign outcomes from the 
computed probabilities.  
In Tables 6.3 I report the goodness of fit of models with different income specifications 
summarized across all periods. The preferred model predicts the probability of having drugs 
prescribed or recommended very close to its observed mean. The prediction that 30.3 percent of the 
sample is prescribed or assigned drugs is close to the drug probability mean of 29.5 percent observed 
in real life. Similarly, the prediction that on average 54.7 percent of the sample is in average or good 
health at the end of the period is close to the observed 56.3 percent of the sample reporting to be in 
good or average health. 
The predicted probability of all drugs being purchased is on average 4.9 percent higher than 
the drug purchase probability observed in real life. This discrepancy is likely caused by inaccuracies 
in the selection of the group for which drug purchase is simulated. In the simulation of drug 
prescription (selection equation), the group that is predicted to have drugs prescribed has a better 
lagged health on average than the group that had drugs prescribed in real life. This accuracy issue 
could be mitigated in the future by an extended model that incorporates medical care demand 
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equations, and in which the outcome variables in these new equations are added as explanatory 
variables in the drug prescription equation.   
 The goodness of fit was similar for models with different definitions of income. The model 
with the pension spline function had a slightly better fit than the basic model with log pension 
income: the predicted outcomes were 0.24 percent closer to observed average drug prescription, 0.13 
percent closer to the observed average drug purchase, and 0.57 percent closer to the observed average 
health outcome. However, this was not a major improvement in the fit of the model. I chose to use the 
basic model as the preferred model because of the ease of interpretation of its results.   
The exclusion restrictions in individual equations of the preferred model were tested for 
validity. All instruments were significant or jointly significant in the equations where they belong. 
The likelihood ratio test was conducted and confirmed that the instruments were not statistically 
significant predictors in equations from which they were excluded.31    
 
                                                 
31
 In this likelihood ratio test the preferred model is considered the restricted model, and the model in 
which the instruments are added to all equations is considered the unrestricted model. 
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Table 6.3: Goodness of Fit Summary: (i) Basic Model, (ii) Extension with Income Interactions,  
(iii) Household Income Spline Function, (iv) Pension Spline Function 
 
 
Preferred 
Model (Basic) 
 
Extension: 
Income 
Interactions 
 
Extension: 
Household 
Income Spline 
Function 
 
Extension: 
Pension 
Spline 
Function 
 
  
      
 
 
 
ALL OBSERVATIONS (first time period - initial condition) 
IC health 0.584           
Predicted 0.583 -0.03%  0.589 0.55%  0.581 -0.27%  0.589 0.57% 
            
 
 
ALL OBSERVATIONS (time period = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7) 
  
 
  
 
     
 
  
 
  
 
Drugs  
Prescribed 0.295           
Predicted 0.303 0.81%  0.300 0.50%  0.301 0.64%  0.297 0.26% 
            
Drugs 
Obtained 0.731           
Predicted 0.780 4.90%  0.783 5.29%  0.780 4.96%  0.778 4.77% 
            
Health 
Outcome 0.553           
Predicted 0.547 -0.67%  0.545 -0.81%  0.550 -0.33  0.552 -0.10% 
            
Note: All estimations are for Het 4-1, no normalization of time-invariant coefficients. 100 reps in simulations. 
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6.3. Results at the Set of Equations Level 
 
6.3.1. Simulations - Testing Income Effect Hypotheses  
To summarize and paraphrase my formal hypotheses, Hypothesis 1 tests whether income 
affects drug purchase of the elderly woman; Hypothesis 2 tests whether the household pools its 
resources and thus the elderly woman’s drug purchasing behavior depends only on total household 
income, regardless of her contribution to it; Hypothesis 3 tests whether income affects the elderly 
woman’s health; and Hypothesis 4 tests whether the household pools its resources in production of 
the elderly woman’s health.  
Income affects the elderly woman’s decision to purchase drugs directly by increasing her 
ability to pay for drugs, but also indirectly by having influenced both her lagged health in the 
previous period and her probability of having drugs prescribed or recommended to her. The 
coefficients on household income and pension income in the drug purchase equation can be used to 
compute the direct marginal effect of income. However, to test the hypotheses derived from the 
theoretical model, we should look at the total income effects, which include both direct and indirect 
components. To do so, we must look at the preferred model’s results at the set of equations level.  
I use simulations 1, 2, 3 and 4 (referred to as S1, S2, S3 and S4 below) to test the four 
hypotheses postulated in the theoretical model. The reported results are point estimates (Table 6.4). In 
simulations S1 and S3, I increase household income without increasing the elderly woman’s pension 
income – in other words, the source of the increase in household income is a household member other 
than the elderly woman. In simulations S2 and S4 I increase both pension income and household 
income by the same amount – here the source of the increase in household income is the elderly 
woman’s pension. In simulations S1 and S2, the income increase is 100 rubles in each time period. In 
Simulations S3 and S4, the income increase is 400 rubles in each time period.  
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Table 6.4: Simulation Results: Hypothesis Testing  
 
 Base 
Model 
 Simulation 1:     
Increase 
household 
income by 100 
rubles every 
time period 
 Simulation 2:    
Increase 
pension 
income by 100 
rubles every 
time period 
 Simulation 3:    
Increase 
household 
income by 400 
rubles every 
time period 
 Simulation 4:    
Increase 
pension 
income by 400 
rubles every 
time period 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
    
Change 
from Base 
Model  
Change 
from Base 
Model  
Change 
from Base 
Model  
Change 
from Base 
Model 
Drugs 
Prescribed  0.295             
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
Predicted 0.303  0.303 -0.04%  0.311 0.81%  0.302 -0.09%  0.331 2.82% 
             
 
 
Drugs 
Obtained 0.731             
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
Predicted 0.780  0.781 0.11%  0.778 -0.11%  0.782 0.21%  0.774 -0.56% 
              
              
Health 
Outcome 0.553             
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
Predicted 0.547  0.549 0.21%  0.553 0.64%  0.551 0.48%  0.566 1.95% 
 
 
Notes:  Average values across all time t (2 through 7) periods are reported.  Coefficients from the preferred 
model and 100 replications of each observation are used. 
 
Increasing the elderly woman’s pension income by 100 rubles (S1) has a negative total effect 
of a very small magnitude on the probability of obtaining all prescribed/recommended drugs (-0.12 
percent on average each period). Increasing household income without increasing pension income 
(S2) has a positive effect of similar magnitude on the probability that all drugs are purchased (0.11 
percent). These total income effects reflect both the statistically insignificant direct effects of income 
on drug purchase as well as several indirect income effects channeled through (1) the effect of lagged 
health on drug purchase (statistically insignificant) which in turn is influenced by the effect of income 
in the health production function (positive and significant), and (2) the effect of income on drug 
prescription (positive, statistically significant for pension income and insignificant for household 
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income) which in turn is influenced also by the lagged health (positive, statistically significant) and 
thus the effect of income in the health production function (positive and significant). Both the direct 
and the main indirect effects (1) and (2) through which additional indirect effects are channeled are 
statistically insignificant and of small magnitude (except for the pension effect on drug prescription). 
I cannot reject the null Hypothesis 1 that income does not affect drug purchasing behavior. I reject the 
null Hypothesis 2 that households pool resources. 
Increasing the household income via increasing the elderly woman’s pension by 100 rubles 
increases the elderly woman’s probability of being in good or average health by 0.65 percent (a 400 
ruble pension income increase leads to a 2 percent increase in the probability of good or average 
health). Increasing the household income caused by an increase of some other household member’s 
income leads to a smaller effect on health: a 100 ruble household income increase leads to a 0.21 
percent improvement in health (a 400 ruble household income increases the elderly woman’s 
probability of being in good or average health by 0.5 percent). Because the direct and main indirect 
income effects are statistically significant, albeit of small magnitude, I reject the null Hypothesis 3 
that income does not affect the health outcome. I reject the null Hypothesis 4 that households pool 
resources because an increase in the pension income has a four times larger positive marginal effect 
on the elderly woman’s health than an increase in some other household member’s income.    
The model allows us to see the dynamic character of the positive income effect on health. In 
the Table 6.5 I report the increase in the probability of good or average health for the sub-sample of 
elderly women observed in all 7 rounds between 1994 and 2002. During this time, their likelihood of 
being in good or average health declined as they aged, by approximately 10 percentage points. 
However, an income increase can slow down the descent into bad health, and the positive effect on 
health would accumulate over time.  For example, if the government increased the elderly women’s 
pension income by 400 rubles in each time period, their likelihood of good or average health would 
be 2.1 percent higher in the first period and 4.5 percent higher in the seventh period.   
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Table 6.5: Simulation Results: Per-period Effect of Pension Income Increase on Health  
 
Predicted Health Outcome 
 
Total Per-period Effect  
of Pension Income Increase 
on the Likelihood of  
Good or Average Health Outcome 
 
Baseline 
Preferred Model 
 
Simulation S4 
(400 ruble increase  
in pension income  
each time period) 
Percentage points 
(S4 minus Base) 
 
Percent  
Change 
 
Round 2 (1995) 0.588 0.600 0.012 2.058 
Round 3 (1996) 0.574 0.591 0.017 3.031 
Round 4 (1998) 0.524 0.545 0.021 4.097 
Round 5 (2000) 0.507 0.530 0.023 4.581 
Round 6 (2001) 0.520 0.537 0.017 3.279 
Round 7 (2002) 0.487 0.509 0.022 4.520 
 
6.3.2 Simulations - Government Policies 
 I next use estimates from the preferred model to simulate the effects of potential policy 
changes. The ability to predict the total effects of a policy is a useful advantage of the joint estimation 
method that corrects for endogeneity of health; such policy simulations could not be made using only 
direct effects estimated in each equation separately. In January 2005, a new Russian law went into 
effect, replacing in-kind drug discounts with cash transfers to the elderly.32 I simulate what would 
happen to the drug purchase behavior and the health of our sample if discounts were eliminated from 
all regions during all periods and replaced by a cash grant in all periods. I report results (point 
estimates) from these selected policy simulations in Table 6.6. 
 I first look at the effect of eliminating drug discounts without any cash compensation in 
Simulation S5. I set the average community rates of drug discount eligibility and drug discount size 
equal to zero across all regions and time periods.  The elimination of discounts seems to have a 
profound effect on the behavior of the elderly women: it lowers their probability of obtaining 
prescribed/recommended drugs by 14.4 percentage points. The effect on their health is also negative 
but less dramatic: it lowers the probability of being in good health by 0.75 percentage points.  
                                                 
32
 The law officially went into effect in January 2005, but individual regions have been dragging their 
feet implementing it. 
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In S6 and S7 I simulate the new law. I eliminate drug discounts and at the same time generate 
a cash transfer to the elderly by increasing their pension income each period by 400 rubles (S6) and, 
less generously but more realistically, by 200 rubles (S7). In the case of a 400 ruble increase in 
pension income, the new law would lead to a 16.2 percentage point decrease in the elderly women’s 
probability of obtaining the prescribed/recommended drugs and at the same time increase their 
probability of the good health outcome by 1.18 percentage points. In the case of a 200 ruble increase 
in the pension income, the law would decrease the probability of obtaining drugs by 14.8 percentage 
points and increase the probability of good or average health by 0.4 percentage points.  
 
Table 6.6: Simulation Results: Policies 
 
 Base 
Model 
 Simulation 5:     
Eliminate 
discounts 
 Simulation 6:    
Increase 
pension 
income by 400 
rubles AND 
eliminate 
discounts 
 Simulation 7:    
Increase 
pension 
income by 200 
rubles AND 
eliminate 
discounts 
 Simulation 8:    
Increase  
regional 
discount 
eligibility and 
size to 100% 
     
 
  
 
  
 
  
    
Change 
from Base 
Model  
 
Change 
from Base 
Model  
 
Change 
from Base 
Model  
 
Change 
from Base 
Model 
Drugs 
Prescribed 0.295             
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
Predicted 0.303  0.360 5.66%  0.390 8.69%  0.376 7.28%  0.289 -1.37% 
             
 
 
Drugs 
Obtained 0.731             
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
Predicted 0.780  0.635 -14.43%  0.628 -15.18%  0.632 -14.81%  0.862 8.24% 
              
Health 
Outcome 0.553            
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
Predicted 0.547  0.539 -0.76%  0.558 1.16%  0.550 0.35%  0.549 0.23% 
              
 
Notes:  Average values across all time t (2 through 7) periods are reported.  Coefficients from the preferred 
model and 100 replications of each observation are used. 
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 In simulation S8 I look at the effect of providing free drugs to all elderly as an alternative to 
cash grants. I set the average community discount eligibility rate equal to one across all regions and 
time periods, and set the discount size equal to 100 percent of the drug price. I find that providing free 
drugs to elderly women would increase their probability of obtaining the prescribed/recommended 
drugs by 8.21 percent but increase the probability of being in good or average health only by 0.23 
percent, less than S6 and S7.  
 Comparing the effects of an in-kind drug subsidy policy (S8) to the effects of unrestricted 
cash grants (S6 and S7), it seems that unrestricted cash grants would lead to a lower demand for drugs 
(and thus lower drug expenditures) and a bigger improvement in the health outcome of the elderly 
women than in-kind drug subsidies would. An income increase that is not restricted to drug use can 
increase an individual’s utility by allowing her to allocate resources to alternative health investments, 
such as better diet, better living conditions, or activities that help reduce stress. The unrestricted cash 
grant thus seems to be a better option regardless of whether the Russian government’s goal is to 
improve the health outcome of the elderly or lower the country’s drug expenditures. This conclusion, 
however, is based on simulation of very short-term effects on the health outcome. The effect of the 
above policies may be different if the health outcome is measured at a later point of time instead of 
the end of the survey round, as is done in this study.  To assess whether replacing in-kind drug 
discounts with cash transfers is cost effective in the long run we would have to consider the effects of 
lowered drug use on longer-term health and any the related forms of medical care considered 
substitutes for drugs.  
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6.4. Extension: Comparing Behavior of Groups with Different  Lagged Health  
The preferred model controls for lagged health, but other than that it assumes that income 
effects as well as any other socio-demographic, institutional, regional and time effects are the same 
for all elderly women, regardless of their lagged health status. However, we might expect women 
with bad self-reported lagged health to face more serious illnesses and different institutional 
conventions and constraints, such as drug discount eligibility and drug availability in pharmacies, 
than women with good or average lagged health. Thus the effects of many of socio-demographic and 
institutional factors on the behavior and the health outcome of the two groups may differ. I partially 
address this issue by creating an extended version of the preferred model that includes interactions of 
lagged health with pension and household income, which however produces results close to the 
preferred model (Tables A.2, A.3 and A.4).  
I thus proceed to expand the preferred, four-equation model to a six-equation model, in which 
I estimate the drug prescription and the drug purchase decisions using different equations for the 
groups of women with bad lagged health (relatively less healthy women) and women with good or 
average lagged health (relatively more healthy women).33 I find different pension effects for the two 
groups in the drug prescription equation, different pension effects in the drug prescription equation, 
and different effects of community characteristics in both equations (Tables A.6, A.7, and A.8). 
In the drug prescription equation, the pension effect and pension arrears effect is stronger for 
women with good lagged health than women with bad lagged health. Further, women with good 
lagged health were more likely to have drugs prescribed if they lived in areas with high average drug 
prescription rates, low incidence of reported health problems and high average preventive visit rates; 
these community characteristics had no effect on drug prescription of women with bad lagged health. 
Overall, it appears that community factors have an influence on the drug prescribing pattern when it 
                                                 
33
 I estimate the six-equation model for three definitions of income: logarithmic transformations of 
household income and pension income, a spline function for log pension income, and a spline function for log 
household income. 
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comes to relatively more healthy patients, but prescription patterns for less healthy patients are not as 
much community driven. 
 In the drug purchase equation, income effects continue to be insignificant for both groups. 
The interesting finding is that the average discount eligibility discount rate has a positive effect on the 
drug purchasing behavior of women with bad lagged health, but no effect on women with good 
lagged health. This can be expected because only individuals with serious comorbidities can qualify 
for the “invalid” status in Russia and be eligible for drug discounts. The local prevalence of discounts 
is irrelevant to healthy women who are not likely to qualify.  The likelihood of obtaining all drugs 
decreased for the healthier group of women if they had a university education, lived in areas with 
higher rates of reported problems of drug availability in pharmacies or in areas with higher average 
rates of doctor visits to treat a health problem; their likelihood of obtaining all drugs was also lower in 
several regions.    
The effect of income and lagged health is slightly lower in the 6-equation system than the 4-
equation system. The effects of socio-demographic and community characteristics on health are 
comparable in the two models. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
7.1. Discussion 
In this study I address the relationship between income, drug purchase decision and health of 
elderly Russian women. I do not find evidence of household income or pension income affecting 
elderly women’s decisions to obtain drugs, but I find that income has a modest positive effect on the 
health outcome. An increase in the elderly woman’s pension income has a stronger positive effect on 
her health than an increase in household income that originated from some other source. Thus, 
contrary to the unitary model, the relative control over resources in the household does seem to matter 
in Russia and influence the resource allocation among household members. The policy implication of 
the limits to household pooling of resources is that if the government’s goal is to improve elderly 
women’s health or welfare then transfer interventions targeting their personal income, such as 
pension, would be most effective. 
This study finds that obtaining all prescribed or recommended drugs lowers the probability of 
descending into bad health by 10 percentage points for women with good or average self-assessed 
lagged health who were prescribed drugs. This finding implies that drug therapy can be an effective 
form of disease management. This is an important result in the world marked by skepticism regarding 
whether drug therapy is effective in maintaining health of the elderly.  However, findings of the 
policy simulations in Section 6.3.2 suggest that increases in income (pension income cash transfers) 
may be a more effective way to increase the likelihood of good health outcome than increasing drug 
consumption via in-kind drug subsidies (drug discounts directed to the elderly). This finding should 
be generalized across borders with caution: a relatively lower effect of the drug-targeted costs on 
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health compared to direct income effects could be more characteristic of countries with more serious 
resource constraints, such as Russia, than more wealthy countries, such as the U.S.     
The estimates from the preferred structural model that included unobserved heterogeneity 
differed from the estimates obtained from the exogenous and two-stage (IV, Heckprob) models. The 
difference indicates that permanent individual unobserved heterogeneity plays a role in determining 
the outcomes and should be accounted for in the estimation. The statistically significant factor 
loadings on unobserved heterogeneity in individual equations imply that elderly women who were 
more likely to obtain prescribed or recommended drugs were also more likely to be in good health 
and less likely to have drugs prescribed. 
 
7.2. Limitations and Future Research 
The preferred, jointly estimated model used to analyze the relationship between income, drug 
purchasing behavior and the health outcome in this study is concise and intended to serve as a 
foundation for future research. An expanded future version should consider including additional 
equations for attrition and death, and the decisions to seek out medical care to treat health problems 
and to receive preventive care, which affect the probability of having drugs prescribed.  Any such 
expansions of the set of equations would require finding new valid exclusion restrictions, which is not 
a trivial task. 
 A limitation of this study arises also from the definitions and measurements of the outcome 
variables. The study distinguishes only between two states of the health outcome: (1) good or average 
health and (2) bad health. This measure was created from a five-point-scale self-assessed health 
survey answers. I explored using different measures of health, such as self-assessed health rated on a 
five-point scale and the index for problems with activities of daily living (ADL). The ADL index 
could not be used in the studied period because questions needed to construct it were not included in 
one of the survey rounds. However, a research project of a different period may avoid this problem 
and include ADL and a health outcome measure.   
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Health benefits of many chronic disease management drugs may become evident only after 
several years of use. This study may thus underestimate the overall benefits of drugs because it looks 
at the health outcome at the end of the calendar year during which drug purchasing decisions were 
made. Measuring the health outcome several years after assessing the drug purchasing behavior could 
quite likely lead to finding stronger effects of drug purchasing behavior on health outcome. Since the 
construction of this study’s dataset, five more RLMS rounds were conducted, making it more possible 
to analyze long run effects of drugs in future research.  
The RLMS collects data on the decision to obtain drugs in general, but does not distinguish 
between different types of drugs. The drug purchase variable that encompasses all types of drugs in 
its definition makes it more difficult to capture income effects. While this study found little evidence 
of income effects on the decision to obtain drugs in general, such effects may be visible in studies 
focused on one specific type of drugs.   
Because many drugs were available over-the-counter without any prescription and did not 
require a contact with a physician, in this study some drug users may have incorrectly been selected 
into the group of people with no drug prescription and thus no drug use. An inclusion of drug users in 
the no-drug-use group would lead to an underestimation of the effect of drugs on health.  
The choice of economic resource measures may also be further explored. The end of 1998 
income data comes from the period of hyperinflation in Russia, and using monthly deflators to 
compute real income values may not generate sufficiently accurate measures. The use of household 
income and pension income measures in this study allows making straightforward assessment of the 
pooling hypothesis, which is one of the study’s objectives. It may be interesting, however, to 
investigate replacing household income measure with household assets or expenditures 
(consumption) to proxy for household resources. For example, current expenditures are usually 
considered to be more accurately collected than household income and may better reflect current and 
long term well-being. 
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This study uses current income measures to estimate income effects. Replacing current 
income measures with proxies for permanent income could lead to finding larger income effects. 
Duflo (2001) and Behrman et al (1990) argue that studies of income effects should focus on 
permanent unexpected rather than current income changes, and Stillman (2002) also distinguishes 
between transitory and permanent shocks to income. This distinction has its origin in the life cycle 
theory, according to which households can transfer resources from one period to another and ride out 
transitory shocks to resources, or in other words smooth out their consumption. If households weather 
current income fluctuations then using a transitory definition of income would lead to underreporting 
of income effects on consumption decisions. One way to tease out the effect of transitory versus 
permanent pension and household income in this study would be to follow Stillman (2006) and define 
the permanent income as the average income over all observed rounds and compare its effect to the 
effect of the transitory income shocks defined as deviations from the permanent income.  
 Further, household income, pension income and the living arrangement (e.g. living with an 
adult child) are treated as exogenous explanatory variables in this study, not affected by health of the 
elderly women. An extension to this research may explore estimating household income and living 
arrangement simultaneously with the health outcome and health investment behavior, as well as 
modeling the pension income as an initial condition equation. However, estimating the living 
arrangement choice using the RLMS is problematic because the survey did not collect data from 
elderly women on family members not living in the household. Only in one of the rounds used in this 
survey elderly women were asked if and how many living children they had.  
Last but not least, regional differences in medical services, drug prices and drug discount 
eligibility laws are not always readily transparent in Russia. Federal and state rules exist, but often are 
not adhered to, sometimes due to the lack of funds. Research studies, such as this one, must be aware 
of their limitations arising due to these complexities.  
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APPENDIX A: Estimation Results 
 
 
Table A.1: Set of Four Equations in the Preferred, Jointly Estimated Model (Coefficients) 
 
 Health Status IC Drugs Prescribed Drugs Obtained Health Status 
Height 0.227** [4.128] 
            
Height*age -0.003** [-3.952] 
            
Log pen income     0.522** [3.483] -0.153 [-0.697] 0.295** [2.212] 
Pension miss     3.548** [3.479] -0.823 [-0.556] 2.148** [2.379] 
Log household 
income     -0.030 [-0.796] 0.057 [0.984] 0.121** [3.172] 
Household 
income miss     -0.255 [-0.715] 0.609 [1.116] 1.311** [3.681] 
Lagged Health     0.305** [3.136] 0.000 [-0.003] 1.395** [10.180] 
Drug Prescr             -0.216 [-0.986] 
Drugs Obtained             -0.167 [-0.722] 
Health*prescr             -0.789** [-2.789] 
Health*purchase             0.725** [2.350] 
Age 0.373** [2.270] 0.350** [5.170] -0.050 [-0.432] -0.287** [-4.194] 
Agesq 0.00 
   
[0.435] -0.002** [-4.602] 0.000 [0.511] 0.001** [2.820] 
Lives with 
spouse, other 
adults, not own 
adult child     0.009 [0.036] 0.307 [0.764] -0.366 [-1.517] 
Lives with 
spouse and own  
adult child     0.055 [0.323] 0.337 [1.216] -0.480** [-3.027] 
Lives with other 
adults, not own 
child or spouse     -0.273 [-1.368] 0.247 [0.861] 0.022 [0.120] 
Lives with own 
adult child, no 
spouse     -0.123 [-0.831] -0.202 [-0.944] -0.262* [-1.859] 
Number 
children     -0.099 [-1.369] 0.023 [0.198] 0.030 [0.506] 
Number 
working adults     -0.089 [-1.287] 0.120 [1.052] 0.099 [1.583] 
Number retirees     -0.271** [-2.424] 0.071 [0.402] 0.153 [1.472] 
Education 2 0.313* [1.664] -0.101 [-0.710] 0.233 [1.321] 0.059 [0.489] 
Education 3 0.553** [2.765] -0.044 [-0.307] 0.121 [0.666] 0.264** [2.109] 
Education 4 0.785** [3.083] -0.078 [-0.425] -0.379* [-1.671] 0.537** [3.177] 
Avg Prescr     4.314** [4.060]         
Avg Disc Elig     -0.044 [-0.116] 1.268** [2.225]     
Avg Disc Size     -0.004 [-0.625] 0.002 [0.183]     
Avg No Drug 1     0.010 [0.022] 0.849 [1.270]     
Avg No Drug 2     0.779* [1.843] -1.634** [-2.336]     
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Table A.1: Set of Four Equations in the Preferred, Jointly Estimated Model (Coefficients) 
(Continued) 
 
 Health Status IC Drugs Prescribed Drugs Obtained Health Status 
Avg Health Pr -1.964* [-1.907] -1.081 [-1.482] 1.521 [1.365] -1.918** [-2.866] 
Avg DocVisit -0.447 [-0.445] -0.367 [-0.531] 3.124** [2.883] 1.110* [1.760] 
Avg Prevention 0.917 [0.788] 2.682** [2.750] -5.715** [-3.602] 1.883* [1.956] 
Avg Hospital 6.432 [1.469] 2.950 [1.584] -3.160 [-0.740] 0.756 [0.308] 
Region n -0.289 [-0.707] 0.175 [0.364] 0.095 [0.128] -0.531 [-1.092] 
Region c -0.323 [-1.123] 0.406 [1.244] 0.331 [0.558] -0.417 [-1.241] 
Region v -0.033 [-0.112] -0.166 [-0.450] 0.210 [0.323] -0.252 [-0.717] 
Region u -0.031 [-0.094] 0.447 [1.179] 0.789 [1.178] 0.141 [0.365] 
Region ws -0.249 [-0.751] 0.955** [2.382] -0.367 [-0.558] -0.283 [-0.702] 
Region es -0.355 [-1.033] 0.147 [0.346] 0.338 [0.495] -0.361 [-0.892] 
Region ca -0.556* [-1.671] 0.438 [1.102] 0.119 [0.178] -0.403 [-1.046] 
Rural -0.084 [-0.509] 0.094 [0.718] 0.213 [1.186] -0.202** [-1.976] 
1996 0.218 [0.850] 0.563 [1.459] 1.258 [1.617] -0.277 [-0.672] 
1998 0.456* [1.651] 1.114** [2.845] 0.805 [0.993] -0.263 [-0.623] 
2000 -0.216 [-0.849] 0.798* [1.860] -0.181 [-0.248] 0.554 [1.229] 
2001 0.201 [0.798] 1.002** [2.243] 1.345 [1.509] 1.273** [2.532] 
2002 0.114 [0.406] 0.301 [0.788] 0.067 [0.102] 0.218 [0.597] 
TimeXreg_3_2     -0.176 [-0.288] -1.077 [-1.033] 0.177 [0.271] 
TimeXreg_3_3    -0.631 [-1.407] -2.069** [-2.429] 0.342 [0.705] 
TimeXreg_3_4    0.035 [0.074] -1.542* [-1.701] 0.139 [0.281] 
TimeXreg_3_5    -0.444 [-0.871] -1.476 [-1.526] -0.042 [-0.077] 
TimeXreg_3_6    -1.210** [-2.315] -1.099 [-1.143] 1.080* [1.904] 
TimeXreg_3_7    -0.482 [-0.865] -1.320 [-1.354] 0.399 [0.689] 
TimeXreg_3_8    -0.890* [-1.696] -1.335 [-1.376] 0.358 [0.665] 
TimeXreg_4_2    -1.010 [-1.561] -2.121** [-1.965] 0.034 [0.050] 
TimeXreg_4_3    -0.822* [-1.822] -1.656* [-1.883] 0.417 [0.845] 
TimeXreg_4_4    -0.560 [-1.144] -0.771 [-0.795] 0.275 [0.545] 
TimeXreg_4_5    -1.238** [-2.359] -2.386** [-2.385] -0.347 [-0.619] 
TimeXreg_4_6    -1.552** [-2.834] -1.595 [-1.585] 0.380 [0.660] 
TimeXreg_4_7    -0.249 [-0.440] -2.160** [-2.173] 0.895 [1.497] 
TimeXreg_4_8    -0.711 [-1.359] -1.952** [-1.994] 0.610 [1.123] 
TimeXreg_5_2    -0.018 [-0.027] -0.203 [-0.216] -0.675 [-0.980] 
TimeXreg_5_3    -0.450 [-0.951] -0.136 [-0.170] -0.112 [-0.215] 
TimeXreg_5_4    -0.070 [-0.140] 0.843 [0.937] -0.341 [-0.643] 
TimeXreg_5_5    -0.686 [-1.258] -0.864 [-0.957] -0.465 [-0.795] 
TimeXreg_5_6    -1.207** [-2.150] 1.253 [1.298] -0.945 [-1.577] 
TimeXreg_5_7    -0.385 [-0.630] -0.017 [-0.017] -0.584 [-0.944] 
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Table A.1: Set of Four Equations in the Preferred, Jointly Estimated Model (Coefficients) 
(Continued) 
 
 Health Status IC Drugs Prescribed Drugs Obtained Health Status 
TimeXreg_5_8    -0.224 [-0.422] 0.046 [0.052] 0.290 [0.511] 
TimeXreg_6_2    -0.589 [-0.900] -1.343 [-1.251] -1.259* [-1.734] 
TimeXreg_6_3    -1.126** [-2.298] -0.444 [-0.464] -0.925 [-1.632] 
TimeXreg_6_4    -0.192 [-0.378] 0.867 [0.825] -1.083* [-1.899] 
TimeXreg_6_5    -1.241** [-2.233] -1.012 [-0.920] -1.067* [-1.705] 
TimeXreg_6_6    -1.440** [-2.573] -0.484 [-0.460] -0.174 [-0.273] 
TimeXreg_6_7    -0.663 [-1.086] -1.060 [-0.960] -1.259* [-1.930] 
TimeXreg_6_8    -0.460 [-0.842] -0.332 [-0.322] -0.616 [-1.016] 
TimeXreg_7_3    0.119 [0.283] 0.813 [1.081] 0.136 [0.301] 
TimeXreg_7_4    0.163 [0.357] 1.685* [1.904] 0.242 [0.523] 
TimeXreg_7_5    -0.719 [-1.398] 0.380 [0.389] 0.013 [0.025] 
TimeXreg_7_6    -0.955* [-1.794] 1.283 [1.404] -0.296 [-0.526] 
TimeXreg_7_7    0.302 [0.529] 0.178 [0.185] -0.460 [-0.812] 
TimeXreg_7_8    0.317 [0.652] -0.250 [-0.314] 0.376 [0.750] 
Constant -32.637** [-3.407] -15.256** [-5.712] 0.002 [0.001] 6.615** [2.526] 
Rhocl (Heterogeneity) 6.532** [6.596] -6.250** [-7.303] 2.172** [4.395] 4.833** [6.418] 
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Table A.2 Drug Prescription Equation: Comparison of Different Income Specifications (Coefficients) 
 
 Time Invariant Heterogeneity - 4 Mass Points 
 
No heterogeneity Basic Model Income Interactions 
Log Pension  
Income Splines 
Log Household 
Income Splines 
Likelihood: -7769.57 -7552.36 -7547.10 -7548.85 -7541.24 
Log pension 0.491** [3.838] 0.522** [3.483] 0.51566** [3.365]   0.50153** [3.307] 
Lpen spline1       1.04599** [2.777]   
Lpen spline2       -0.330 [-0.514]   
Lpen spline3       0.541 [0.750]   
Lpen spline4       0.947* [1.705]   
Pension miss 3.287** [3.789] 3.548** [3.479] 3.562** [3.499] 6.874** [2.819] 3.389** [3.294] 
Health* 
log pension     0.017 [0.464]     
No spouse* log pension     -0.007 [-0.158]     
Adult child* log pension     0.007 [0.173]     
Log household income -0.044 [-1.406] -0.030 [-0.796] -0.038 [-0.811] -0.032 [-0.847]   
Lhh spline1         -0.065 [-1.412] 
Lhh spline2         0.202 [0.576] 
Lhh spline3         -0.039 [-0.120] 
Lhh spline4         0.058 [0.313] 
Household inc missing -0.394 [-1.354] -0.255 [-0.715] -0.263 [-0.711] -0.262 [-0.742] -0.443 [-1.167] 
Health* 
log hhinc     0.037 [1.033]     
No spouse* loghhinc     0.022 [0.540]     
Adult child* loghhinc     -0.041 [-1.077]     
Lagged Health -0.861** [-13.343] 0.305** [3.136] -0.081 [-0.251] 0.309** [3.232] 0.294** [2.982] 
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Table A.2 Drug Prescription Equation: Comparison of Different Income Specifications (Coefficients) - Continued 
 
 Time Invariant Heterogeneity - 4 Mass Points 
 
No heterogeneity Basic Model 
Income 
Interactions 
Log Pension  
Income Splines 
Log Household 
Income Splines 
Age 0.273** [5.118] 0.350** [5.170] 0.349** [5.400] 0.350** [5.097] 0.353** [5.090] 
Age sq -0.002** [-4.962] -0.002** [-4.602] -0.002** [-4.777] -0.002** [-4.551] -0.002** [-4.528] 
Lives with spouse, other adults, 
not own adult child -0.035 [-0.182] 0.009 [0.036] 0.025 [0.095] 0.013 [0.049] 0.006 [0.024] 
Lives with spouse and own  
adult child -0.010 [-0.078] 0.055 [0.323] 0.323 [0.918] 0.048 [0.288] 0.062 [0.368] 
Lives with other adults, not own 
child or spouse -0.248* [-1.832] -0.273 [-1.368] -0.357 [-0.894] -0.287 [-1.480] -0.266 [-1.348] 
Lives with own adult child, no 
spouse -0.126 [-1.174] -0.123 [-0.831] 0.017 [0.042] -0.118 [-0.798] -0.119 [-0.795] 
Number children -0.055 [-1.079] -0.099 [-1.369] -0.093 [-1.258] -0.099 [-1.375] -0.104 [-1.410] 
Number working adults -0.078 [-1.489] -0.089 [-1.287] -0.088 [-1.223] -0.086 [-1.253] -0.109 [-1.524] 
Number retirees -0.143* [-1.735] -0.271** [-2.424] -0.264** [-2.381] -0.269** [-2.412] -0.293** [-2.579] 
Education 2 -0.069 [-0.814] -0.101 [-0.710] -0.111 [-0.791] -0.102 [-0.735] -0.099 [-0.693] 
Education 3 -0.005 [-0.056] -0.044 [-0.307] -0.045 [-0.314] -0.052 [-0.361] -0.040 [-0.280] 
Education 4 0.030 [0.256] -0.078 [-0.425] -0.086 [-0.479] -0.086 [-0.472] -0.085 [-0.464] 
Avg Prescr 4.662** [5.004] 4.314** [4.060] 4.310** [3.835] 4.257** [4.026] 4.368** [3.920] 
Avg Disc Elig 0.025 [0.081] -0.045 [-0.116] -0.052 [-0.136] -0.037 [-0.096] -0.087 [-0.228] 
Avg Disc Size -0.005 [-0.941] -0.004 [-0.625] -0.004 [-0.644] -0.004 [-0.671] -0.004 [-0.617] 
Avg No Drug 1 0.216 [0.562] 0.010 [0.022] -0.021 [-0.046] 0.006 [0.012] 0.032 [0.070] 
Avg No Drug 2 0.565 [1.249] 0.779* [1.843] 0.769* [1.803] 0.788* [1.856] 0.777* [1.849] 
Avg Health Pr -1.590** [-2.667] -1.081 [-1.482] -1.041 [-1.427] -1.086 [-1.470] -1.062 [-1.416] 
Avg DocVisit -0.913 [-1.284] -0.367 [-0.531] -0.382 [-0.546] -0.354 [-0.512] -0.363 [-0.518] 
Avg Prevention 2.709** [3.227] 2.682** [2.750] 2.654** [2.735] 2.659** [2.706] 2.65** [2.723] 
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Table A.2 Drug Prescription Equation: Comparison of Different Income Specifications (Coefficients) - Continued 
 
 Time Invariant Heterogeneity - 4 Mass Points 
 
No heterogeneity Basic Model Income Interactions 
Log Pension  
Income Splines 
Log Household 
Income Splines 
Avg Hospital 1.702 [0.946] 2.951 [1.584] 3.023 [1.408] 2.827 [1.346] 2.919 [1.159] 
Rural 0.046 [0.535] 0.094 [0.718] 0.087 [0.681] 0.097 [0.747] 0.088 [0.668] 
1996 0.552 [1.389] 0.563 [1.459] 0.552 [1.367] 0.592 [1.507] 0.555 [1.583] 
1998 0.973** [2.347] 1.114** [2.845] 1.106** [2.635] 1.021** [2.470] 1.129** [3.162] 
2000 0.668 [1.510] 0.798* [1.860] 0.794* [1.731] 0.795* [1.789] 0.794** [2.016] 
2001 0.895** [1.972] 1.002** [2.243] 1.008** [2.088] 0.989** [2.151] 0.988** [2.417] 
2002 0.378 [1.003] 0.301 [0.788] 0.286 [0.709] 0.290 [0.740] 0.282 [0.802] 
Constant -14.232** [-6.794] -15.255** [-5.712] -15.06** [-6.071] -18.579** [-5.356] -14.955** [-5.571] 
Rhocl (Heterogeneity)   -6.249** [-7.303] -6.236** [-7.290] -6.231** [-7.094] -6.316** [-7.480] 
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Table A.3 Drug Purchase Equation: Comparison of Different Income Specifications (Coefficients) 
 
 Time Invariant Heterogeneity - 4 Mass Points 
 
No heterogeneity Basic Model Income Interactions 
Log Pension  
Income Splines 
Log Household  
Income Splines 
Likelihood: -7769.57 -7552.36 -7547.10 -7548.85 -7541.24 
           
Log pension -0.157 [-0.664] -0.153 [-0.697] -0.132 [-0.615]     -0.260 [-1.410] 
Lpen spline1             -0.012 [-0.023]     
Lpen spline2             -0.304 [-0.330]     
Lpen spline3             0.182 [0.194]     
Lpen spline4             -0.592 [-0.741]     
Pension miss -0.847 [-0.531] -0.823 [-0.556] -0.782 [-0.550] 0.092 [0.027] -1.650 [-1.330] 
Health* log pension         0.063 [1.022]         
No spouse* log pension         -0.037 [-0.477]         
Adult child* log pension         -0.054 [-0.739]         
Log household income 0.056 [0.898] 0.057 [0.984] 0.045 [0.675] 0.058 [1.020]     
Lhh spline1                 -0.058 [-0.805] 
Lhh spline2                 0.520 [0.924] 
Lhh spline3                 0.305 [0.541] 
Lhh spline4                 0.769* [1.921] 
Household inc missing  0.600 [0.993] 0.609 [1.116] 0.718 [1.205] 0.619 [1.133] -0.002 [-0.004] 
Health* log hhinc         -0.053 [-0.850]         
No spouse* loghhinc         0.085 [1.191]         
Adult child* loghhinc         0.002 [0.036]         
Lagged Health 0.458** [3.476] 0.000 [-0.003] 0.020 [0.037] -0.004 [-0.025] -0.004 [-0.026] 
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Table A.3 Drug Purchase Equation: Comparison of Different Income Specifications (Coefficients) - Continued 
 
 Time Invariant Heterogeneity - 4 Mass Points 
 
No heterogeneity Basic Model Income Interactions 
Log Pension  
Income Splines 
Log Household  
Income Splines 
Age -0.038 [-0.330] -0.050 [-0.432] -0.041 [-0.371] -0.049 [-0.424] -0.048 [-0.448] 
Agesq 0.000 [0.515] 0.000 [0.511] 0.000 [0.455] 0.000 [0.507] 0.000 [0.562] 
Lives with spouse, other adults, 
not own adult child 0.223 [0.561] 0.307 [0.764] 0.302 [0.746] 0.302 [0.751] 0.348 [0.857] 
Lives with spouse and own  
adult child 0.393 [1.448] 0.337 [1.216] 0.658 [1.122] 0.336 [1.216] 0.345 [1.243] 
Lives with other adults, not own 
child or spouse 0.206 [0.740] 0.247 [0.861] -0.142 [-0.203] 0.251 [0.878] 0.267 [0.933] 
Lives with own adult child, no 
spouse -0.211 [-1.012] -0.202 [-0.944] -0.307 [-0.437] -0.211 [-0.984] -0.191 [-0.895] 
Number children 0.005 [0.044] 0.023 [0.198] 0.033 [0.286] 0.021 [0.184] 0.002 [0.015] 
Number working adults 0.103 [0.936] 0.120 [1.052] 0.106 [0.931] 0.121 [1.058] 0.020 [0.169] 
Number retirees -0.016 [-0.095] 0.071 [0.402] 0.052 [0.290] 0.068 [0.387] -0.015 [-0.084] 
Education 2 0.198 [1.195] 0.233 [1.321] 0.231 [1.299] 0.224 [1.264] 0.228 [1.283] 
Education 3 0.110 [0.640] 0.121 [0.666] 0.100 [0.548] 0.116 [0.633] 0.110 [0.606] 
Education 4 -0.374* [-1.722] -0.380* [-1.671] -0.395* [-1.730] -0.386* [-1.695] -0.445* [-1.958] 
Avg Disc Elig 1.327** [2.113] 1.268** [2.225] 1.255** [2.153] 1.286** [2.216] 1.216** [2.125] 
Avg Disc Size 0.002 [0.185] 0.002 [0.183] 0.002 [0.219] 0.002 [0.164] 0.002 [0.217] 
Avg No Drug 1 0.500 [0.650] 0.849 [1.270] 0.833 [1.268] 0.832 [1.254] 0.949 [1.443] 
Avg No Drug 2 -1.323* [-1.808] -1.634** [-2.336] -1.676** [-2.410] -1.622** [-2.364] -1.675** [-2.410] 
Avg Health Pr 1.887* [1.662] 1.521 [1.365] 1.591 [1.494] 1.504 [1.463] 1.631 [1.559] 
Avg DocVisit 3.325** [3.060] 3.124** [2.883] 3.146** [3.007] 3.113** [2.988] 3.231** [3.107] 
Avg Prevention -5.848** [-3.531] -5.715** [-3.602] -5.909** [-4.401] -5.644** [-3.877] -5.887** [-4.822] 
Avg Hospital -2.986 [-0.715] -3.160 [-0.740] -3.601 [-0.821] -3.148 [-1.090] -3.032 [-0.717] 
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Table A.3 Drug Purchase Equation: Comparison of Different Income Specifications (Coefficients) - Continued 
 
 Time Invariant Heterogeneity - 4 Mass Points 
 
No heterogeneity Basic Model Income Interactions 
Log Pension  
Income Splines 
Log Household  
Income Splines 
Region n 0.023 [0.031] 0.095 [0.128] 0.063 [0.084] 0.081 [0.125] 0.092 [0.126] 
Region c 0.293 [0.476] 0.331 [0.558] 0.334 [0.551] 0.340 [0.641] 0.350 [0.615] 
Region v 0.098 [0.151] 0.210 [0.323] 0.203 [0.304] 0.220 [0.378] 0.252 [0.403] 
Region u 0.746 [1.116] 0.789 [1.178] 0.796 [1.160] 0.789 [1.284] 0.826 [1.268] 
Region ws -0.311 [-0.479] -0.367 [-0.558] -0.352 [-0.529] -0.357 [-0.599] -0.328 [-0.517] 
Wegion es 0.345 [0.506] 0.338 [0.495] 0.351 [0.504] 0.334 [0.541] 0.338 [0.509] 
Region ca 0.212 [0.317] 0.119 [0.178] 0.103 [0.151] 0.123 [0.200] 0.144 [0.224] 
Rural 0.284 [1.620] 0.213 [1.186] 0.204 [1.135] 0.219 [1.217] 0.199 [1.104] 
1996 1.297* [1.723] 1.258 [1.617] 1.246 [1.242] 1.251* [1.709] 1.152 [1.489] 
1998 0.890 [1.195] 0.805 [0.993] 0.784 [0.989] 0.811 [1.215] 0.855 [1.150] 
2000 0.032 [0.041] -0.181 [-0.248] -0.258 [-0.351] -0.170 [-0.251] -0.237 [-0.347] 
2001 1.434* [1.732] 1.345 [1.509] 1.268 [1.277] 1.356* [1.657] 1.274 [1.414] 
2002 0.105 [0.154] 0.067 [0.102] -0.006 [-0.008] 0.095 [0.153] -0.060 [-0.093] 
Constant -0.093 [-0.021] 0.002 [0.001] -0.306 [-0.066] -0.918 [-0.164] 1.284 [0.300] 
Rhocl (Heterogeneity)     2.172** [4.395] 2.146** [4.414] 2.167** [4.682] 2.127** [4.367] 
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Table A.4: Health Status Equation: Comparison of Different Income Specifications (Coefficients) 
 
 No heterogeneity Time Invariant Heterogeneity - 4 Mass Points 
 
 
Basic Model Income Interactions 
Log Pension  
Income Splines 
Log Household 
Income Splines 
Likelihood: -7769.57 -7552.36 -7547.10 -7548.85 -7541.24 
           
Log pension 0.296** [2.281] 0.295** [2.212] 0.280** [2.029]     0.288** [2.136] 
Lpen spline1             0.231 [1.089]     
Lpen spline2             0.231 [0.397]     
Lpen spline3             1.201* [1.700]     
Lpen spline4             -0.665 [-1.137]     
Pension miss 2.179** [2.485] 2.148** [2.379] 2.105** [2.319] 1.748 [1.276] 2.092** [2.294] 
Health*  
log pension         0.038 [1.128]         
No spouse* log pension         -0.029 [-0.743]         
Adult child* log pension         0.001 [0.029]         
Log household income 0.121** [3.440] 0.121** [3.172] 0.141** [2.960] 0.123** [3.243]     
Lhh spline1                 0.105** [2.230] 
Lhh spline2                 -0.077 [-0.225] 
Lhh spline3                 0.935** [2.885] 
Lhh spline4                 -0.335* [-1.797] 
Household inc missing  1.265** [3.883] 1.311** [3.681] 1.253** [3.398] 1.321** [3.692] 1.238** [3.205] 
Health*  
log hhinc         -0.035 [-0.987]         
No spouse* loghhinc         -0.020 [-0.523]         
Adult child* loghhinc         0.005 [0.127]         
Lagged Health 2.030** [24.911] 1.395** [10.180] 1.452** [4.294] 1.378** [9.911] 1.421** [10.451] 
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Table A.4: Health Status Equation: Comparison of Different Income Specifications (Coefficients) - Continued 
 
 No heterogeneity Time Invariant Heterogeneity - 4 Mass Points 
 
 
Basic Model Income Interactions 
Log Pension  
Income Splines 
Log Household 
Income Splines 
Drugs Prescribed -1.241** [-6.115] -0.216 [-0.986] -0.207 [-0.962] -0.208 [-0.959] -0.227 [-1.039] 
Drugs Obtained 0.205 [0.897] -0.167 [-0.722] -0.173 [-0.758] -0.172 [-0.750] -0.157 [-0.680] 
Health * Prescribed -0.547* [-1.914] -0.789** [-2.789] -0.805** [-2.854] -0.794** [-2.785] -0.797** [-2.826] 
Health * Obtained 0.488 [1.538] 0.725** [2.350] 0.726** [2.342] 0.732** [2.368] 0.727** [2.366] 
Age -0.192** [-3.428] -0.287** [-4.194] -0.289** [-5.147] -0.292** [-4.159] -0.280** [-4.071] 
Agesq 0.001** [2.267] 0.001** [2.820] 0.001** [3.500] 0.001** [2.848] 0.001** [2.728] 
Lives with spouse, other adults, not 
own adult child -0.286 [-1.391] -0.366 [-1.517] -0.366 [-1.503] -0.368 [-1.520] -0.399* [-1.669] 
Lives with spouse and own  adult 
child -0.376** [-2.793] -0.480** [-3.027] -0.524 [-1.563] -0.479** [-3.014] -0.509** [-3.218] 
Lives with other adults, not own 
child or spouse 0.045 [0.306] 0.022 [0.120] 0.330 [0.874] 0.037 [0.208] 0.018 [0.099] 
Lives with own adult child, no 
spouse -0.207* [-1.735] -0.262* [-1.859] 0.024 [0.061] -0.276* [-1.942] -0.278** [-1.973] 
Number children 0.000 [-0.001] 0.030 [0.506] 0.028 [0.472] 0.027 [0.467] 0.020 [0.338] 
Number working adults 0.072 [1.288] 0.099 [1.583] 0.102* [1.653] 0.099 [1.564] 0.099 [1.536] 
Number retirees 0.072 [0.783] 0.153 [1.472] 0.146 [1.422] 0.150 [1.423] 0.147 [1.415] 
Education 2 0.048 [0.521] 0.059 [0.489] 0.068 [0.585] 0.056 [0.473] 0.054 [0.449] 
Education 3 0.201** [2.036] 0.264** [2.109] 0.264** [2.180] 0.261** [2.067] 0.254** [2.073] 
Education 4 0.415** [3.217] 0.537** [3.177] 0.539** [3.371] 0.533** [3.171] 0.515** [3.073] 
Avg Health Pr -1.608** [-2.433] -1.918** [-2.866] -1.900** [-2.852] -1.948** [-2.934] -1.975** [-2.992] 
Avg Doc Visit 1.198** [2.057] 1.110* [1.760] 1.155* [1.841] 1.084* [1.716] 1.113* [1.791] 
Avg Prevention 1.813* [1.921] 1.883* [1.956] 1.858* [1.931] 1.931** [2.000] 1.875** [1.960] 
Avg Hospital 1.720 [1.309] 0.756 [0.308] 0.586 [0.243] 0.873 [0.411] 0.636 [0.314] 
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Table A.4: Health Status Equation: Comparison of Different Income Specifications (Coefficients) - Continued 
 
 No heterogeneity Time Invariant Heterogeneity - 4 Mass Points 
 
 
Basic Model Income Interactions 
Log Pension  
Income Splines 
Log Household 
Income Splines 
Rural -0.201** [-2.358] -0.202** [-1.976] -0.202** [-1.980] -0.197* [-1.946] -0.216** [-2.134] 
1996 -0.255 [-0.667] -0.277 [-0.672] -0.272 [-0.723] -0.305 [-0.810] -0.298 [-0.773] 
1998 -0.155 [-0.396] -0.263 [-0.623] -0.268 [-0.679] -0.223 [-0.567] -0.294 [-0.728] 
2000 0.613 [1.498] 0.554 [1.229] 0.556 [1.348] 0.562 [1.348] 0.519 [1.226] 
2001 1.241** [2.805] 1.273** [2.532] 1.292** [2.876] 1.274** [2.776] 1.200** [2.590] 
2002 0.089 [0.258] 0.218 [0.597] 0.240 [0.694] 0.241 [0.685] 0.181 [0.514] 
Constant 5.246** [2.492] 6.615** [2.526] 6.555** [2.906] 7.174** [2.368] 6.607** [2.565] 
Rhocl (Heterogeneity)     4.833** [6.418] 4.755** [6.240] 4.909** [6.467] 4.713** [6.606] 
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Table A.5: Distribution of Permanent Unobserved Heterogeneity in the Preferred, 
Jointly Estimated Model with 4 Mass Points 
 
 
 
POINT #            PROBABILITY WEIGHT  (π )         MASS POINT  (µ ) 
1                         0.028                                                0.000 
2                         0.519                                                0.704 
3                         0.255                                                0.433 
4                         0.199                                                1.000 
 
 
 
PROBABILITY WEIGHT (π ) RESULTS: 
 
COEFFICIENT    T-score 
PROB WT                        2.925          7.091 
PROB WT                        2.213          6.025 
PROB WT                        1.966          2.940 
 
MASS POINT (µ ) RESULTS: 
 
COEFFICIENT    T-score 
MASS PT                         0.866           4.353 
MASS PT                        -0.271          -1.120 
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Table A.6: Drug Prescription Equation - Comparison of Four-Equation and Six-Equation 
Jointly Estimated Models (Coefficients) 
 
 4- Equation Model  6- Equation Model 
 
Drugs Prescribed 
All women  
Drugs Prescribed 
Health Good  
Drugs Prescribed 
Health Bad 
Log pen income 0.524 ** [3.436]  0.580 ** [3.327]  0.468 ** [2.469] 
Pension miss 3.520 ** [3.411]  3.864 ** [3.281]  3.221 ** [2.513] 
Log household 
income -0.032  [-0.836]  -0.014  [-0.262]  -0.041  [-0.771] 
Household income 
miss -0.269  [-0.767]  -0.149  [-0.297]  -0.335  [-0.656] 
Lagged Health 0.292 ** [2.987]         
Age 0.352 ** [4.748]  0.242 ** [3.626]  0.373 ** [3.707] 
Agesq -0.002 ** [-4.229]  -0.001 ** [-2.787]  -0.002 ** [-3.388] 
Lives with spouse, 
other adults, not 
own adult child -0.008  [-0.031]  -0.188  [-0.560]  0.331  [0.881] 
Lives with spouse 
and own  adult 
child 0.066  [0.398]  0.030  [0.140]  0.119  [0.466] 
Lives with other 
adults, not own 
child or spouse -0.290  [-1.513]  -0.413  [-1.619]  -0.078  [-0.283] 
Lives with own 
adult child, no 
spouse -0.103  [-0.700]  -0.065  [-0.334]  -0.152  [-0.705] 
Number children -0.088  [-1.271]  -0.074  [-0.819]  -0.115  [-1.151] 
Number working 
adults -0.090  [-1.354]  -0.125  [-1.383]  -0.046  [-0.470] 
Number retirees -0.275 ** [-2.473]  -0.321 ** [-2.162]  -0.224  [-1.426] 
Education 2 -0.086  [-0.632]  -0.139  [-0.801]  -0.096  [-0.520] 
Education 3 -0.040  [-0.286]  -0.132  [-0.753]  0.082  [0.419] 
Education 4 -0.065  [-0.362]  -0.007  [-0.032]  -0.412  [-1.527] 
Avg Prescr 3.249 ** [2.912]  4.128 ** [2.815]  1.606  [0.927] 
Avg Disc Elig -0.045  [-0.129]  0.065  [0.137]  -0.069  [-0.131] 
Avg Disc Size 0.000  [-0.030]  -0.009  [-1.241]  0.009  [1.110] 
Avg No Drug 1 -0.128  [-0.284]  0.284  [0.498]  -0.826  [-1.245] 
Avg No Drug 2 0.810 ** [2.117]  0.614  [1.189]  0.979 * [1.749] 
Avg Health Pr -1.060  [-1.505]  -1.745 * [-1.933]  -0.034  [-0.034] 
Avg DocVisit 0.471  [0.734]  -0.574  [-0.652]  1.669 * [1.743] 
Avg Prevention 2.880 ** [3.115]  4.335 ** [3.973]  1.020  [0.837] 
Avg Hospital 2.805  [1.448]  5.745 * [1.734]  -0.703  [-0.200] 
Region n -0.031  [-0.101]  0.158  [0.430]  -0.044  [-0.106] 
Region c 0.010  [0.049]  0.209  [0.804]  -0.122  [-0.400] 
Region v -0.158  [-0.674]  -0.075  [-0.267]  -0.373  [-1.041] 
Region u -0.198  [-0.811]  -0.189  [-0.635]  -0.257  [-0.708] 
Region ws 0.084  [0.329]  -0.170  [-0.545]  0.450  [1.167] 
Region es 0.017  [0.063]  -0.088  [-0.265]  0.148  [0.379] 
Region ca 0.204  [0.800]  0.220  [0.713]  0.119  [0.317] 
Rural 0.103  [0.806]  0.135  [0.868]  -0.060  [-0.343] 
1996 0.071  [0.506]  0.132  [0.659]  0.002  [0.012] 
1998 0.336 ** [2.018]  0.503 ** [2.226]  0.157  [0.640] 
2000 0.443 ** [2.222]  0.343  [1.265]  0.579 * [1.938] 
2001 0.344  [1.639]  0.135  [0.473]  0.586 * [1.893] 
2002 0.331  [1.489]  0.247  [0.836]  0.446  [1.345] 
Constant -15.285 ** [-5.312]  -11.798 ** [-4.569]  -15.365 ** [-3.701] 
RHOcl -6.424 ** [-7.085]  -5.743 ** [-6.020]  -7.536 ** [-6.857] 
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Table A.7: Drug Purchase Equation - Comparison of Four-Equation and Six-Equation 
Jointly Estimated Models (Coefficients) 
 
 4- Equation Model  6- Equation Model 
 
Drugs Obtained 
All women  
Drugs Obtained 
Health Good  
Drugs Obtained 
Health Bad 
Log pen income -0.116  [-0.574]  0.057  [0.193]  -0.111  [-0.386] 
Pension miss -0.665  [-0.489]  0.502  [0.254]  -0.580  [-0.298] 
Log household 
income 0.037  [0.674]  -0.055  [-0.563]  0.083  [1.174] 
Household income 
miss 0.439  [0.831]  -0.266  [-0.280]  0.838  [1.258] 
Lagged Health 0.015  [0.094]         
Age -0.091  [-0.793]  0.059  [0.296]  -0.127  [-0.874] 
Agesq 0.001  [0.864]  0.000  [-0.304]  0.001  [0.976] 
Lives with spouse, 
other adults, not 
own adult child 0.250  [0.638]  0.726  [0.858]  -0.007  [-0.014] 
Lives with spouse 
and own  adult child 0.332  [1.225]  -0.071  [-0.167]  0.654 * [1.792] 
Lives with other 
adults, not own 
child or spouse 0.267  [0.954]  1.047 * [1.715]  0.078  [0.230] 
Lives with own 
adult child, no 
spouse -0.226  [-1.081]  -0.121  [-0.339]  -0.256  [-0.947] 
Number children 0.039  [0.359]  -0.175  [-1.105]  0.265 * [1.655] 
Number working 
adults 0.130  [1.163]  0.284  [1.508]  0.015  [0.103] 
Number retirees 0.092  [0.532]  0.309  [1.023]  -0.044  [-0.202] 
Education 2 0.217  [1.256]  0.108  [0.374]  0.331  [1.491] 
Education 3 0.107  [0.609]  0.321  [1.066]  -0.082  [-0.360] 
Education 4 -0.372 * [-1.691]  -0.820 ** [-2.478]  -0.033  [-0.102] 
Avg Disc Elig 1.675 ** [3.154]  -0.136  [-0.158]  2.833 ** [3.959] 
Avg Disc Size -0.004  [-0.424]  -0.009  [-0.569]  -0.005  [-0.406] 
Avg No Drug 1 0.538  [0.837]  0.471  [0.495]  0.391  [0.489] 
Avg No Drug 2 -1.330 ** [-2.168]  -1.758 ** [-2.073]  -1.181  [-1.529] 
Avg Health Pr 1.747 * [1.650]  0.180  [0.126]  2.099 * [1.649] 
Avg DocVisit 2.252 ** [2.251]  3.840 ** [2.713]  1.419  [1.257] 
Avg Prevention -4.021 ** [-2.820]  -2.423  [-1.313]  -4.192 ** [-2.412] 
Avg Hospital -4.208  [-1.067]  -0.521  [-0.082]  -5.249  [-1.005] 
Region n -0.608  [-1.593]  -0.508  [-0.814]  -0.690  [-1.410] 
Region c -0.016  [-0.055]  -0.736  [-1.629]  0.371  [0.987] 
Region v 0.512  [1.576]  -0.526  [-1.081]  1.073 ** [2.527] 
Region u 0.099  [0.297]  -1.028 ** [-2.064]  0.677  [1.524] 
Region ws -0.322  [-0.893]  -1.500 ** [-2.782]  0.350  [0.740] 
Region es -0.248  [-0.675]  -0.571  [-0.985]  -0.111  [-0.235] 
Region ca -0.396  [-1.117]  -1.728 ** [-3.256]  0.320  [0.687] 
Rural 0.296 * [1.727]  0.009  [0.031]  0.585 ** [2.546] 
1996 -0.124  [-0.536]  -0.316  [-0.863]  0.002  [0.008] 
1998 -0.628 ** [-2.371]  -0.875 ** [-2.294]  -0.334  [-0.994] 
2000 0.031  [0.097]  -0.291  [-0.630]  0.252  [0.617] 
2001 0.944 ** [2.785]  1.154 ** [2.268]  0.852 ** [2.014] 
2002 0.573  [1.624]  0.477  [0.962]  0.615  [1.383] 
Constant 1.891  [0.411]  -1.095  [-0.136]  1.721  [0.295] 
RHOcl 2.181 ** [4.409]  1.765 * [1.950]  2.463 ** [3.660] 
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Table A.8: Health Status Equation - Comparison of Four-Equation and Six-Equation 
Jointly Estimated Models (Coefficients) 
 
 Four Equation Model  Six Equation Model 
Log pen income 0.311 ** [2.352]  0.309 ** [2.268] 
Pension miss 2.279 ** [2.552]  2.262 ** [2.457] 
Log household income 0.124 ** [3.401]  0.122 ** [3.285] 
Household income 
miss 1.304 ** [3.841]  1.282 ** [3.643] 
Lagged Health 1.395 ** [10.192]  1.391 ** [11.593] 
Drug Prescr -0.219  [-1.008]  -0.243  [-1.139] 
Drugs Obtained -0.167  [-0.739]  -0.128  [-0.572] 
Health*prescr -0.762 ** [-2.726]  -0.769 ** [-2.714] 
Health*purchase 0.708 ** [2.335]  0.698 ** [2.248] 
Age -0.294 ** [-4.111]  -0.286 ** [-5.606] 
Agesq 0.001 ** [2.852]  0.001 ** [3.790] 
Lives with spouse, 
other adults, not own 
adult child -0.334  [-1.379]  -0.357  [-1.499] 
Lives with spouse and 
own  adult child -0.466 ** [-2.940]  -0.476 ** [-3.012] 
Lives with other 
adults, not own child 
or spouse 0.034  [0.189]  0.003  [0.019] 
Lives with own adult 
child, no spouse -0.247 * [-1.753]  -0.246 * [-1.788] 
Number children 0.024  [0.399]  0.024  [0.420] 
Number working 
adults 0.098  [1.574]  0.099  [1.585] 
Number retirees 0.159  [1.546]  0.166  [1.622] 
Education 2 0.049  [0.415]  0.060  [0.524] 
Education 3 0.258 ** [2.098]  0.255 ** [2.106] 
Education 4 0.510 ** [3.045]  0.561 ** [3.361] 
Avg Health Pr -1.771 ** [-2.858]  -1.845 ** [-2.929] 
Avg DocVisit 1.386 ** [2.375]  1.401 ** [2.416] 
Avg Prevention 1.764 * [1.912]  1.868 ** [2.024] 
Avg Hospital -0.302  [-0.155]  -0.149  [-0.072] 
Region n -0.722 ** [-2.780]  -0.743 ** [-2.888] 
Region c -0.352 ** [-1.968]  -0.370 ** [-2.088] 
Region v -0.267  [-1.416]  -0.247  [-1.346] 
Ru -0.048  [-0.233]  -0.050  [-0.241] 
Region ws -0.191  [-0.894]  -0.205  [-0.978] 
Res -0.408 * [-1.848]  -0.412 * [-1.902] 
Region ca -0.125  [-0.607]  -0.105  [-0.526] 
Rural -0.190 * [-1.850]  -0.154  [-1.555] 
1996 0.012  [0.096]  0.014  [0.109] 
1998 0.048  [0.373]  0.047  [0.370] 
2000 0.270 ** [2.101]  0.264 ** [2.065] 
2001 0.433 ** [2.885]  0.425 ** [2.862] 
2002 0.308 ** [2.144]  0.300 ** [2.115] 
Constant 6.633 ** [2.511]  6.390 ** [3.134] 
RHOcl 4.824 ** [6.213]  4.837 ** [7.079] 
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Table A.9: Distribution of Permanent Unobserved Heterogeneity in the Six-Equation, 
Jointly Estimated Model with 4 Mass Points 
 
 
     
 
                POINT #                  PROBABILITY WEIGHT  (π )            MASS POINT  (µ ) 
                    1                                  0.028                                                  0.000 
                    2                                  0.267                                                  0.428 
                    3                                  0.532                                                  0.698 
                    4                                  0.173                                                  1.000 
 
 
 
PROBABILITY WEIGHT (π ) RESULTS: 
 
                               COEFFICIENT   T-score 
PROBWTcl                          2.242           6.219 
PROBWTcl                          2.933           7.713 
PROBWTcl                         1.807           3.050 
 
MASS POINT (µ ) RESULTS: 
 
                               COEFFICIENT   T-score 
MASSPTcl                        -0.290           -1.216 
MASSPTcl                          0.836             3.883 
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